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INTRODUCTION 
World cooperation has generated a variety of supranational organiza-
tions, with responsibilities ranging from trade to crimes against 
humanity. 1 These organizations often include judicial-like tribunals, and 
these tribunals have and will increasingly create law. Together, they are 
evolving a global legal culture.2 This legal culture will initially derive 
from national legal cultures and yet, over time, will transform national 
legal cultures. The legal principles that will guide this emerging global 
legal culture must now be analyzed in order to gain some understanding 
of the future. This Article offers a framework for thinking about the future 
development of global legal systems. 
The twin pillars of the immediate iteration of this global legal culture 
will be the civil law and the common law systems. This prediction is not 
mere transatlantic chauvinism. These legal systems have, for good and 
bad reasons, migrated around the world. At present, 33.8% of the world's 
jurisdictions, encompassing 55.6% of the world's population, are based 
upon the civil law model, or civil law systems mixed with others (indige-
nous or religious legal ideologies, for example). The common law model, 
along with systems mixed with it, include 28.24% of the jurisdictions, 
and 14.68% of the world's population. Hence, combined, civil and com-
mon law-based legal cultures cover over 70% of the world's population 
in over 62% of the jurisdictions.3 Moreover, the two currently dominant 
governments are the United States (U.S.) and the European Union 
I. The term "supranational organization" is used for a particular type of international 
organization that is "empowered to exercise directly some of the functions otherwise reserved to 
states." Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective Suprana-
tional Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273,287 (1997). 
2. "Legal culture" is used here to encompass the panoply of societal elements associated 
with a legal system. Lawrence Friedman, a United States legal sociologist, has focused on that 
concept. While he noted that other scholars have used the term differently, his use of the term 
"refers to ideas, values, expectations and attitudes towards law and legal institutions, which 
some public or some part of the public holds." Lawrence M. Friedman, The Concept of Legal 
Culture: A Reply, in COMPARING LEGAL CULTURES 34 (David Nelken ed., 1997). He intended 
that what falls within this term is "living law." /d. at 36. The term is criticized for lack of rigor 
and coherence: "The imprecision of these formulations makes it hard to see what exactly the 
concept covers and what the relationship is between the various elements said to be included 
within its scope." Roger Cotterrell, The Concept of Legal Culture, in COMPARING LEGAL CuL-
TURES 13, 15 (David Nelken ed., 1997). Cotterrell conceded that it is useful "for its emphasis on 
the sheer complexity and diversity of the social matrix in which contemporary state legal sys-
tems exist." !d. at 29. In this Article's discussion, breadth is much preferred to precision, and 
hence the term seems appropriate. 
3. See University of Ottawa, World Legal Systems, at http://www.droitcivil.uottawa.ca/ 
world-legal-systems/eng-systeme.html (Oct. I, 2003) (information about jurisdiction); see also 
World Legal Systems Website, at http://www.droitcivil.uottawa.calworld-legal-systems/ 
eng-tabl.html (last visited Dec. 2, 2003) (information about population). 
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(E.U.).4 The U.S., with due respect to its country of origi~. England, 
represents the common law system, albeit its own version. The E. U. has 
largely adopted civil law concepts, again with due respect to England and 
Ireland's common law presence in the E.U., and hence, will add strength 
to consideration of civil law principles. For these reasons, the first steps 
toward a global legal culture will be dominated by some blending of civil 
law and common law. 
Of course, analysis based on the merger of these systems can only 
provide a plausible beginning in envisioning the global legal culture be-
cause, as recognized below, other customary and indigenous legal 
cultures, many of which have mixed with the two transatlantic systems, 
will certainly have increasing impact on the global legal culture. Any pre-
diction of global culture in any regard faces claims of overwhelming 
diversity, but we have seen an unprecedented merging of cultures in re-
cent times in the face of such cultural diversity. The development of 
supranational organizations such as the E.U. demonstrates the develop-
ment of an integrated legal culture in the face of seemingly incompatible 
and even belligerent histories. In sum, it is plausible to conceive of a 
global legal culture, even in the face of great diversity, and to forecast that 
the early stages of that legal culture will borrow a good deal from civil 
law and common law experiences. 
Careful consideration of this emerging legal culture has become an 
imperative. As a U.S. legal scholar, I feel a particular sense of urgency in 
that enterprise. Other legal regimes, both supranational and national, have 
increasing impact on U.S. legal practice and U.S. laws. Yet, few U.S. 
4. The term "E.U. law" in this Article is a concession to popular usage. Technically, it is 
a misnomer. Hanlon provided one brief description of the correct nomenclature: 
The TEU [Treaty of European Union or Maastricht Treaty] created the 'European 
Union'. It consists of three 'Pillars'. In the middle are three existing Communities, 
(i.e. ECSC [European Coal and Steel Community], Eurotom and the E.C. [European 
Community]). These three Communities will be known collectively as the European 
Communities. It will be noted that the TEU officially changed the name to E.C., 
dropping the "Economic" from the title. On either side of this central "Pillar" is the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Cooperation in Justice and Home 
Affairs (JHA). These three "Pillars" support the over-arching constitutional order of 
the Union. However, only the central Pillar, the E.C., is governed by Community law. 
The CFSP Pillar and the JHA Pillar are governed by intergovernmental cooperation. 
This means they are outside the jurisdiction of the Community institutions, particu-
larly the Court of Justice. Neither will any of the Articles of the outside Pillars be 
enforceable, or challengeable, in National Courts. Thus, although the Union is wider 
than the European Community it has its roots in the Community. 
JAMES HANLON, EUROPEAN CoMMUNITY LAW 9 (2d ed. 2000). Another justification for an 
inclusive sense of "E. U. law" is that the future will almost surely see a body of law covering all 
three pillars, although many of the aspects of the two "outside" pillars will be ruled more by 
politics than law as in the U.S. 
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lawyers have more than mere superficial knowledge of other legal sys-
tems. While legal systems are generally local and nationalistic, the U.S. 
legal culture has remained even more isolated than most. On the other 
hand, lawyers from other legal systems have been studying the U.S. sys-
tem, often from the inside (obtaining U.S. law degrees and participating 
in U.S. firms), for generations. To a large extent, the health of the U.S. 
legal culture and effectiveness of U.S. practitioners depend on how 
quickly its practitioners and scholars can catch up. 
To encourage all, but particularly U.S., lawyers to think about trans-
formation of the law, this Article will envision a global legal regime. The 
purpose is more reflective than predictive. Nominally, the Article has 
three parts. The first Part offers an overview description of the emerging 
supranational legal institutions and the major forces moving them. The 
next Part will outline civil law legal concepts and provide background for 
common law readers. To further the goal of this Article, it will do so as it 
suggests some issues that will arise as the civil law system is incorporated 
into the global legal system. The last Part will move to the Article's major 
goal of setting up a framework for contemplating the basis on which a 
global legal culture might evolve, to some extent, on the merger of this 
globalized version of civil law thinking with U.S. common law thinking. 
Some effort is made to suggest how other major legal cultures may im-
pact on this system but with the recognition that thinking about the 
interaction of the two major transatlantic systems is sufficiently ambitious 
for one Article. 
Actually, the analysis is a unit presented in three stages: institutions, 
civil law overview, and then the blending of the civil law and common 
law legal cultures. The first stage of the analysis looks to the experience 
and development of four centralizing regimes with global impact: the 
U.S., Europe, the United Nations (U.N.), and the World Trade Organiza-
tion (WTO). Since the work is about legal culture the concentration is on 
the adjudicative institutions of these four organizations. Largely for back-
ground, the piece looks to the experience of the U.S. federal courts and 
the European trade and human rights regimes. The U.S. provides the pre-
diction with 200 years of experience, and Europe provides it with about 
50 years. The latter experience is more relevant because it is a recent 
uniting of a number of national legal cultures. Just as useful to this analy-
sis is the fact that Europe has taken some steps in melding civil law and 
common law legal cultures. The U.N. engages in human rights creation, 
promotion and enforcement. Its International Court of Justice (ICJ) pre-
sents a plausible and, in fact, working global tribunal for those purposes. 
It will also provide some experience in unifying a legal culture. Like 
Europe, the global regime has a trade regime separate from its human 
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rights regime. The trade regime now has the WTO to promote and protect 
trade values. The WTO has its own court-like bodies. Again, the WTO 
adjudicative apparatus is presented more as a plausible vehicle for devel-
oping global law, but it also provides a centralizing experience. The 
European experience demonstrates that this putative trade regime will 
ultimately affect almost every aspect of national law, indeed society in 
general. Like Europe, both the U.N.'s rights tribunal and the WTO's trade 
tribunal have been and must continue to deal with the tension between 
civil law and common law ideologies. So, we have plausible nascent 
world tribunals and we can engage in at least some preliminary thoughts 
about evolution of a global legal culture recognizing that these tribunals 
might be the vehicles for carrying it forward. 
Now we can begin the job of contemplating what this global legal 
culture will look like. As stated, about half the world's population is liv-
ing under some form of civil law system. Thus, it is imperative that 
common law lawyers and scholars understand some of the basic tenets of 
a civil law legal system in order to engage in predictions about a global 
legal culture. Underneath this discussion, and continued into the next 
stage, is the observation that there are subtle but fundamental ideological 
differences between civil and common law legal thinking, despite some 
appearance of convergence between the two great transatlantic systems. 
Our task also requires sufficient understanding of the civil law model in 
order to form thoughts about the melding of that model with the common 
law approach. While these two legal systems have common cultural as 
well as legal sources, a person from a civil law system will have a differ-
ent intuitive understanding of law than someone from a common law 
system. The task here is to gain enough understanding to contemplate 
how a civil law legal mind will think about an issue on the world stage. 
Thus, this Part also projects the civil law ideology into the global legal 
culture in order to move the analysis forward, as well as offer some 
common understanding of the civil law model. 
Finally, we can blend in the common law. A separate discussion of 
the common law ideology does not seem necessary because I anticipate 
that most of the readers will come from a common law legal culture, 
more precisely the U.S. An understanding of the basic tenets of the com-
mon law model is presented in the discussion of the interaction of the two 
models. The primary goal of this stage of the analysis is to identify areas 
of tension between common law and civil law ideologies. Nonetheless, I 
suggest potential resolutions of those areas of tension. More ambitiously, 
I identify certain aspects of these models that might best be adapted to the 
global legal culture. These suggestions will be set up by the efforts in the 
second stage to suggest how a given aspect of the civil law system might 
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emerge in the global legal culture. Some much more cautious attempts are 
made to identify aspects of other legal cultures, e.g., Islamic or Asian, that 
might have impact on the current development of the global legal culture. 
I recognize that a variety of potential legal ideas may be adapted from 
other legal cultures, or develop from the creative energies of future gen-
erations, but contemplating those is simply too much at this point. 
Hopefully, these three analytical stages come together in the readers 
mind to present a framework for analysis. Some effort is made to engage 
in divination. It is simply irresistible to do otherwise, but the real goal of 
this piece is to lay groundwork and encourage thinking about the dimen-
sions of a global legal culture. Although I encourage U.S. lawyers and 
legal scholars especially to become engaged, all the citizens of the world 
must be active in the design of the global legal culture. 
I. EMERGING GLOBAL INSTITUTIONS AND THE FORCES 
THAT WILL SHAPE THEIR LAWS 
This Part examines the judicial-like tribunals that will contribute to 
the global legal culture. It focuses on the two major global adjudicative 
institutions, the World Trade Organization's (WTO) dispute settlement 
apparatus and the United Nation's (U.N.) human rights adjudications. In 
order to suggest the impact these tribunals may have, and how they may 
contribute to the evolution of a global legal regime, it looks at the evolu-
tion of the European legal regime and, to a lesser extent, the centralization 
of U.S. law over its history. 
A. Present and Future World Judicial Regimes 
Two parallel nascent global judicial regimes are evolving in a 
world-wide legal culture: the trade adjudicators and rights adjudicators. 
Trade adjudicators began to evolve when the WTO's "Dispute Settlement 
Bodies" (DSB) were created. An ultimate rights adjudicator machine has 
evolved from the U.N.'s International Court of Justice (ICJ) (sometimes 
referred to as the "World Court").5 Mostly, the assertion is that these two 
already important world tribunals will fill the adjudicative vacuum created 
by the globalization of society in general. 
There are 18 international tribunals that are composed of permanent, 
independent judges with authority to issue binding decisions on cases 
5. Helfer & Slaughter, supra note I, at 285. In particular, they observe that the "Com-
mittee" is becoming increasingly court-like. /d. at 338, 344, 365. Even though Helfer and 
Slaughter assert that the United Nations Human Rights Committee (UNHRC) is a much more 
important human rights body than many recognized, the UNHRC is not likely to assume the 
role of adjudicator. I d. at 279. 
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between two or more parties.6 Some 96 bodies "in the international sys-
tem that are charged by States with the job of interpreting international 
law" might also be seen as part of a global judicial regime.7 The U.S. par-
ticipates in a large number of such adjudicative mechanisms.8 Most of 
these bodies are relatively new.9 Still, the WTO dispute settlement ma-
chinery and the ICJ seem most likely to gain some dominance among the 
world's tribunals. Therefore, we can profitably reflect on a global legal 
system radiating from these two adjudicative regimes. 
The Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
("GATT") established the WTO, embodied in the Agreement Establishing 
the World Trade Organization [hereinafter, the "WTO Agreement"]. 
GATT began in 1947, and has since served as framework for several 
global free trade negotiations or "rounds." In its current iteration, the 
WTO has considerable power. The WTO has already given evidence of its 
potential for reviewing a wide range of national laws and practices.10 
McGinnis and Movsesian, for example, observed that, "The possibility of 
covert protectionism thus necessarily forces the WTO to address envi-
ronmental, health, and safety issues."11 They offer two models for the 
future of WTO development: the anti-discrimination model and the regu-
latory model. The former is much less intrusive on national law than the 
latter. The latter results in the WTO making global social policy regula-
tions to replace national regulations rejected as inconsistent with a world 
market. These two pro-free trade commentators warned that: "[l]n light 
of its academic and political support, the regulatory model will likely 
compete with the antidiscrimination model in shaping the WTO of the 
future." 12 While both models presage significant shifts in sovereignty, the 
"regulatory model" suggests a more aggressive imposition of a global 
social policy on WTO member nations. 
6. Shane Spelliscy, Note, The Proliferation of International Tribunals: A Chink in the 
Armor, 40 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 143, 147 (2001). 
7. Id. at 146. 
8. Although debatable, U.S. participation, and hence, delegation of "judicial power," 
does not appear to violate the principals of the U.S. Constitution. Brian Havel, The Constitution 
in an Era of Supranational Adjudication, 78 N.C. L. REV. 257 (2000) (arguing that suprana-
tional tribunals may, along with state courts and legislative courts, "share" in the exercise of the 
Constitution's judicial power). 
9. Spelliscy, supra note 6, at 148 ("Only two out of the eighteen have been in existence 
for over thirty years and only four for more than twenty years ... "). 
10. "One of the WTO's more remarkable and controversial innovations is its mechanism 
for resolving trade disputes among member states." Mark L. Movsesian, Sovereignty, Compli-
ance, and the World Trade Organization: Lessons from the History of Supreme Court Review, 20 
MICH. J. lNT'L L. 775,777 (1999) (citing the massive literature that has already emerged). 
11. John 0. McGinnis & Mark L. Movsesian, The World Trade Constitution, 114 HARV. 
L. REV. 511,550 (2000). 
12. /d. at 552. 
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The growth of economic activity covered by supranational govern-
ment spurs corresponding growth in formal dispute resolution 
procedures. 13 Originally, GATT made no provision for formal judicial 
dispute resolution, but the Uruguay Round resulted in an agreement on 
dispute settlement procedures. 14 GATT provides that: "The WTO shall 
administer the Understanding of Rules and Procedures Governing the 
Settlement of Disputes ... in Annex 2 to this Agreement." 15 The WTO 
provides for the resolution of disputes among member states in the "Dis-
pute Settlement Understanding" (DSU). DSU provides a panel of experts, 
but not necessarily legal experts, to hear complaints from nations and de-
cide whether a member's laws violate GATT trade principles. 16 The 
complaining party may seek compensation if the offending country fails 
to implement the final decision. 17 The only sanction at present, however, 
authorizes the unsatisfied complaining country to retaliate against the of-
fending party. 
Parallel to trade, but moving more cautiously, is the global rights le-
gal culture and the judicial regimes supporting it. Several specialized 
rights adjudicative bodies have developed over the years. 18 The general 
human rights adjudicative institution, which has begun to evolve into a 
global right enforcing body, is the International Court of Justice. The 
ICJ's jurisdiction is very broad and it may be engaged to decide any types 
of "disputes" as defined by the treaty. 19 Statehood is the only necessary 
qualification to be a party.20 Although not necessarily confined to rights 
cases, the ICJ is the prime candidate to become a comprehensive global 
rights tribunal, and is most likely to evolve into a rights adjudicative 
13. See Alec Stone Sweet & Thomas L. Brunell, Constructing a Supranational Constitu-
tion: Dispute Resolution and Governance in the European Community, 92 AM. PoL. Sci. REv. 
63 (1998); and Alec Stone Sweet & Thomas L. Brunell, The European Court and the National 
Courts: A Statistical Analysis of Preliminary Reference, 1961-1995, 5 J. EuR. Pus. PoL'Y 66 
(1998). 
14. MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK & ROBERT HOWSE, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL 
TRADE 51-53 (2d ed. 1999). 
15. One source of the WTO Agreement and related documents is the Final Act Embody-
ing the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. !5, 1994, LEGAL 
INSTRUMENTs-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. I (1994), 33 l.L.M. 1125 (1994). 
16. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 
15, 1994, art. 6, 8, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 
LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31 (1994), 33 l.L.M. 1226 
(1994). 
17. 
18. 
at 376. 
JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 126 (2d ed. 1997). 
E.g., The Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Helfer & Slaughter, supra note I, 
19. SHABTAI ROSENNE, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT, 
1920-!996 519 (3d ed. 1997) ("[T]he classic definition of dispute is that given by the Perma-
nent Court ... : 'A dispute is a disagreement on a point of law or fact, a conflict of legal views or 
of interests between two persons'"). 
20. /d. at 605. 
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regime.21 Clearly, it will and already has begun to develop a universal le-
gal culture for rights. 22 
The ICJ has had a much longer history than the WTO, and has over 
that time established principles supporting its judicial authority.23 Franck 
identified the ICJ's early 90's decision in Libya's case against the U.S. 
and the U.K. to block extradition of those responsible for the Lockerbie 
airline bombing with Marbury v. Madison. 24 The U.S. Supreme Court in 
Marbury v. Madison laid claim to judicial review power in a manner that 
prevented its claim from being resisted.25 Similarly, the ICJ established its 
authority in the Lockerbie case to review the U.N. Security Council, al-
though it avoided direct confrontation with the U.N.'s political 
institutions.26 Lockerbie, like Marbury, however, is noteworthy for its as-
sertion of review authority, not its cleverness in avoiding direct 
institutional confrontation. 27 
On December 21, 1988, a bomb planted on Pan Am flight 103 ex-
ploded over Lockerbie, Scotland. Two Libyan intelligence agents were 
accused. The U.S. and the U.K. indicted these agents and requested ex-
tradition. Libya refused. The UN Security Council adopted a resolution 
urging Libya to comply. Libya then instituted proceedings in the ICJ 
against the U.S. and U.K. asking the Court to rule that it had complied 
21. For example, the U.S. has agreed to over 70 multilateral treaties and 30 bilateral 
treaties that contain special declarations of acceptance of ICJ jurisdiction without reserving the 
right to refuse consent in a specific case. Jordan J. Paust, Domestic Influence of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice, 26 DENY. J. INT'L L. & PoL'Y 787,789 (1998). 
22. Criminal law is another area where an international legal culture may develop. For a 
discussion of how civil and common law legal cultures may clash in the International Criminal 
Court, see Robert Christensen, Getting to Peace by Reconciling Notions of Justice: The Impor-
tance of Considering Discrepancies Between Civil and Common Legal Systems in the 
Formation of the International Criminal Court, 6 UCLA J. INT'L L & FoREIGN AFF. 391 
(2002). Christensen notes that elements of both civil and common-law procedures will be util-
ized in the ICC. /d. at 399. 
23. Geoffrey R. Watson, Constitutionalism, Judicial Review and the World Court, 34 
HARV. INT'L L.J. I (1993). 
24. Thomas M. Franck, The "Power of Appreciation:" Who is the Ultimate Guardian of 
UN Legality?, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 519 (1992). 
25. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803). Marbury is well known to U.S. lawyers. 
William Marbury was appointed justice of the peace by outgoing President John Adams. He did 
not receive his commission before the new President, Thomas Jefferson, took office. At that 
point his commission was rescinded and he sued James Madison, the new Secretary of State. 
John Marshall, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, ruled that the Court did not have original 
jurisdiction to provide the remedy requested, mandamus. In doing so, he asserted a very strong 
sense of judicial review but, since he did not order the issuance of the commission, this assertion 
could not be resisted. The foundation for strong judicial review was established but the actual 
extent of the exercise of that authority has ebbed and flowed over the Court's history. 
26. Concerning the Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal 
Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. U.S.), 19921.C.J. 114. 
27. Franck, supra note 24, at 520. ("The similarities of the Libyan case to Marbury ex-
tend beyond judicial tactics"). 
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with the relevant international convention, that the U.S. and U.K. had 
violated that convention and to order the U.S. and U.K. to desist threats 
against Libya. Three days after the close of oral hearings, the Security 
Council adopted a resolution ordering members to take coercive action 
against Libya. The ICJ then ruled that Libya was not entitled to relief. 
While several judges felt that the Security Council resolution was control-
ling, others asserted the power to review such resolutions under certain 
circumstances.28 Watson summarized the totality of the case: "The deci-
sion implies that the international community is moving toward a broader 
acceptance of judicial review than the framers of the U.N. Charter per-
haps envisioned-that subsequent practice under the Charter may have 
altered its interpretation."29 
In addition to its constitutional significance, the Lockerbie case, like 
Marbury, resolved questions of private, individual rights. In Marbury, the 
plaintiff asserted his right to an office, whereas in Libya, the ICJ consid-
ered a right to protection from hostile criminal prosecution. The 
Lockerbie case had the added constitutional dimension of establishing 
judicial review of rights disputes among states. Clearly, the foundation for 
serious judicial review authority in the ICJ has been set. Whether it will 
be this adjudicative body, or some new one, it is inevitable that some hu-
man rights judicial regime will become prominent on the world stage. 
In sum, it is easy to make the case that the DSB apparatus in trade 
and the ICJ in rights will continue to evolve into dominant supranational 
tribunals. It is equally likely that these two adjudicative systems will gen-
erate law increasingly affecting the world's population and impacting on 
national legal cultures. More mature examples of similar developments, 
however, are needed to conjure up a vision of the future of this global le-
gal culture. 
B. The E.U. and U.S. Experiences as a Guide to the Future 
of a Global Judicial Regime 
To envision the evolution of a global legal culture, we turn to the 
European and U.S. experiences. Both have developed adjudicative bodies 
to further trade and human rights goals. U.S. courts have contributed to 
the constitutional goal to "form a more perfect union." Europeans seek 
"an ever-closer union," and have established adjudicative bodies that fur-
ther that goal.30 Both demonstrate how a cooperative enterprise can result 
28. U.S. lawyers might relate this ruling to the "political question" limitations on judicial 
review. See Vera Gowlland-Debbas, The Relationship Between the International Court of Jus-
tice and the Security Council in the Light of the Lockerbie Case, 88 AM. J. lNT'L L. 643 (1994). 
29. Watson, supra note 23, at 27. 
30. The E.U. has always been understood as a work in progress, and its members have 
agreed to "an ever closer union." TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Nov. 10, 
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in unified trade and rights regimes.31 Both also demonstrate the symbiotic 
relationship between the central legal authority and their constituent 
states. The European and U.S. rights and trade adjudicative bodies then 
offer some basis for predictions about the evolution of global rights and 
trade regimes. 
Like its European counterparts, the U.S. Supreme Court, along with 
the lower federal courts, exercise power over both federal and state gov-
ernmental institutions. Article III vests "judicial power" in the Supreme 
Court and potential "inferior courts."32 Judicial power "shall extend to all 
cases, in law and equity, arising under this Constitution, the laws of the 
United States, and treaties .... "33 The U.S. Constitution unites judicial 
power over the various rights and commerce powers. Hence, U.S. central 
courts are different from European judicial bodies discussed below in that 
they combine both trade and rights enforcement. 
Movsesian notes the similarities between the emerging WTO dispute 
settlement authority and the early years of the U.S. Supreme Court: 
The history of Supreme Court review has interesting implications 
for today's debate on the WTO. While there are significant dif-
ferences between the two institutions ... the Court and the WTO 
are alike in one essential respect. Both are centralized tribunals 
that purport to decide whether constituents' laws conform to ex-
ternal standards. And, just as the antebellum Court had to 
establish its authority to determine whether state laws conformed 
to federal norms, the WTO must establish its authority to deter-
mine whether national laws conform to international norms. 
Indeed, ... the arguments made in today's debate on the WTO 
greatly resemble those made earlier in the context of Supreme 
Court review.34 
The U.S. has experienced a continuous tension between federalism 
and nationalism, and between the courts and political institutions. Still, 
the power of the federal courts in both rights and trade have grown since 
1997, O.J. (C 340) pmbl. (1997). Recently, the German government proposed that the E.U. 
adopt a true federal government much like its own, but the other members are not ready for 
formalization of that degree of unification. The German state itself resulted from this type of 
progression. The several Germanic entities began to coalesce in 1833 with the establishment of 
the Zo/lerein, a German customs union. ANKE fRECKMANN & THOMAS WEGERICH, THE GER-
MAN LEGAL SYSTEM 19 (1999). 
31. Mark Tushnet, Federalism and Liberalism, 4 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 329 
(1996) (observing a natural tendency toward centralization). 
32. U.S. CONST. art. III,§ I. 
33. /d. at art. III, § 2. 
34. Movsesian, supra note 10, at 813 (citations omitted). 
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its founding and provide some justification for predicting similar tension 
and evolution in world government. 
Although U.S. lawyers have some 200 years of historical experience, 
the recent E. U. experience might better serve to form an understanding of 
centralization generated by supranational govemment.35 For some fifty 
years, the E. U. has sought a "single market" in Europe. 36 The European 
experience predicts that the WTO trade regime and, more to the point, its 
adjudicative institutions will only get stronger.37 The nominal goal of the 
E.U. was economic cooperation, but the E.U. has become comprehen-
sive.38 The E.U.'s well-defined and aggressive legislative structure has 
played a crucial role in centralization.39 But it is the role of judicial review 
35. Thijmen Koopmans, The Birth of European Law at the CrossRoads of Legal Tradi-
tion, 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 493, 505 (1991) ("Personally, I am tempted to think that the Court of 
Justice has become one of the major sources of legal innovation in Europe not only because of 
its position as the Community's judicial institution, but also because of the intellectual strength 
of its comparative methods"). 
36. The European Economic Community, known popularly as the "Common Market," 
was established in 1957 by the Treaty of Rome. A second Treaty of Rome created the European 
Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), separated to accommodate the French. A previous treaty, 
the European Coal and Steel Community, created the first of three communities, and was in 
some senses the prototype. Together, these treaties created the three "communities" united in 
1992 by the Treaty of European Union (Maastricht). This initial treaty has been amended on 
occasion to form a constitution or "basic law." Each one of these iterations resulted in more 
centralization of authority, memorialized by the name change to the "European Union." See 
generally TREATY OF AMSTERDAM AMENDING THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION, THE TREA· 
TIES ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES AND CERTAIN RELATED ACTS, Oct. 2, 1997, 
O.J. (C 340) I (1997) [hereinafter E.U. TREATY]. 
37. While member states such as Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom originally felt 
resistant to give up a certain amount of sovereignty to the E.U., all now seem to have accepted 
the superiority of E.U. law. See, e.g., Re: The Application of Wiinsche Handelsgessellschaft, 
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] [federal constitutional court] 73, 339, 3 C.M.L.R. 225 
(1987) (F.R.G.); Frontine v. Ministero delle Finanze, Corte costituzionale [Corte cost.] [highest 
court for constitutional matters], 27 Dec. 1973, Foro It. 1974, I, 314, 2 C.M.L.R. 372 (1974) 
(Italy); Regina v. Sec. of State for Transport ex parte Factortame Ltd., I Eng. Rep. 70 (H.L. 
1990), 3 C.M.L.R. 375 (1990) (Eng.). 
38. "Difficult as it may now be to believe, the founders of the Community appear to have 
expected the Community institutions to intervene only in very specific ways in the Member 
State economies." George A. Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the Euro-
pean Community and the United States, 94 CoLUM. L. REV. 331, 355 (1994). The evolutionary 
process from this narrow vision, now so "[d]ifficult ... to believe," to the E.U.'s robust and 
broad authority, provides valuable insight into the forces at work in a global trade regime. 
39. Article 4 establishes five institutions: the European Parliament, the Council, the 
Commission, the Court of Justice and the Court of Auditors. E.U. TREATY, supra note 36, art. 4. 
The first three are the political institutions. The allocation of authority among these three institu-
tions may be startling to U.S. lawyers unfamiliar with the E.U.'s legislative process, whereas it 
may not seem extraordinary to those familiar with parliamentary governments. Some may be 
surprised by the European parliament's passive role in the legislative process. The Commission, 
which also administers the laws, has sole authority to initiate legislation, and the Council has 
final enactment authority. These two institutions are constituted so as to represent the member 
states. The Parliament, which is directly elected by E.U. citizens, has various types of review 
and approval authority. In general, the Parliament has the power to stop, or at least make more 
Fall 2003] Envisioning a Global Legal Culture 13 
of national or "member state" actions that provides the relevant experi-
ence for predicting the impact of global tribunals.40 
The judicial authority of the E.U. is delegated to the European Court 
of Justice (ECJ). The ECJ has jurisdiction to enforce the basic law against 
both E.U. institutions and member states.41 E.U. Treaty Article 220 pro-
vides simply: "The Court of Justice shall ensure that in the interpretation 
and application of this Treaty the law is observed."42 The Court may void 
an act of an E.U. institution under Article 231.43 More to the point here, 
under E.U. Treaty Article 228, the Court may review actions by the 
member states to determine if they have "failed to fulfil an obligation" 
under the treaty.44 Both the treaties, as the basic laws, and the legislation 
and regulations implementing them, may be enforced through member 
difficult, the enactment of legislation. The Council, with the advice of the Commission, has the 
final say. The latter two institutions may be comparable in a parliamentary system to the "gov-
ernment," the leadership of the dominant party or parties, which controls legislation as well as 
the executive, and hence Europeans may be more comfortable with this allocation of power. 
Still, each major treaty has given Parliament more power in response to claims of a "democracy 
deficit" and this trend is likely to continue. 
40. For a description of the evolution of integration in the E.U., see Karen J. Alter, The 
European Court's Political Power, 19 W. EUR. PoL. 458 (1996). "The ECJ has become an im-
portant and influential actor in Europe and courts have become political actors in all sorts of 
policy areas. Given that lower national judiciaries in Europe have historically played a much 
less significant role in policy-making than they have in the United States, this transition is espe-
cially significant." /d. at 481. 
41. The basic law does not contain a supremacy clause, as does the U.S. Constitution. 
However, the E.U. Court, in an early display of its activism, recognized the supremacy of E.U. 
law within its area of interest. Costa v. Ente Nazionale PerL' Energia Elettrica ( ENEL), in 1964, 
firmly established that principle and has not been seriously challenged. 
The transfer, by member-States, from their national order, in favour of the Commu-
nity order of the rights and obligations arising from the Treaty, carries with it a clear 
limitation of their sovereign right upon which a subsequent unilateral law, incompati-
ble with the aims of the Community, cannot prevail. As a consequence, Article 177 
[reference from a national court to the E.U. Court] should be applied regardless of 
any national law in those cases where a question of interpretation of the Treaty arises. 
Case 6/64, Costa v. Ente Nazionate Per L'Energia Elettrica, 1964 E.C.R. 585 [1964]3 C.M.L.R. 
425, 456 (1964). Currently, Article 10 (the former Article 5 as applied in Costa) provides that 
"[m]ember States shall take all appropriate measures ... to ensure fulfilment of the obligations 
arising out of this Treaty and resulting from actions taken by the institutions of the Community." 
E.U. TREATY, supra note 36, art. 10. Further, its second paragraph states: "They shall abstain 
from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the objectives of this Treaty." /d. 
Combined with the Court's enforcement jurisdiction, it becomes quite easy for an activist court 
to assert the supremacy of E.U.law, even without a supremacy clause as such. 
42. !d. at art. 220. 
43. !d. at art. 231. 
44. Article 228 provides that a state must take necessary action to comply with the 
Court's judgment and, if it fails to do so, the Court may impose a "penalty payment." !d. at art. 
228. 
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actions. However, E.U. laws may also have "direct effect," giving them 
force in private litigation.45 
Like the U.S. Supreme Court, the ECJ has been extremely activist, 
and the law it created in the E.U.'s formative stage forms the bedrock of a 
strong central authority.46 Bermann summarized its role: "The Court of 
Justice has thus taken virtually every opportunity that presented itself to 
enhance the normative supremacy and effectiveness of Community law in 
the national legal order."47 Even though it has recently been more cau-
tious, as discussed below, legal doctrines it created are still a major 
centralizing force in Europe.48 Alter found: "The European Union's legal 
system has become the most effective international legal system in exis-
tence .... "49 
The "Solange" series of cases involving conflict between the German 
Constitutional Court and the ECJ demonstrates the natural movement to-
ward acceptance of supranational judicial power. 5° The first case arose in 
the late 1960s from a grievance involving a license application by an im-
port-export company, Intemationale Handlelsgesellschaft. The German 
administrative court referred the case to the ECJ on the question of 
45. E.U. issues may be raised before national courts, and the national court may refer 
such questions to the E.U. Court. The E.U. founders took the alternative approach to a "federal" 
court system in contrast to the drafters of the U.S. Constitution. They created only one central 
court, and largely relied on national courts. Moreover, unlike the U.S. federal system, the E.U. 
Court may obtain a case directly from any national tribunal, from the highest national court to 
the lowest, even tribunals outside the judicial system. Article 234 authorizes "preliminary rul-
ings" from "any court or tribunal of a member state" on treaty interpretations, validity of EU 
acts, and interpretation of "statutes of bodies established" by the Council. E.U. TREATY, supra 
note 36, art. 234. 
46. Koopman, supra note 35, at 502 ("As the Court slowly started to act as the Commu-
nity's constitutional court, reviewing Community legislation and declaring national laws 
incomparable with Community law, the most obvious model was the federal constitutional court 
in Karlsruhe: France has no comparable tradition"); Tridimas & Tridimas, supra note 13, at 19 
("[Data] shows the range of discretionary power of the ECJ, that is, the set of policy outcomes 
that it can sanction without its rulings being overturned by new legislation") (emphasis added). 
Because civil law nations in Europe have traditionally been opposed to judicial activism, some 
scholars might be surprised by the acceptance of the European Court of 1 ustice. This acceptance 
may be explained by the Court's essential role in European integration, a common goal of 
member-states. Mark C. Miller, A Comparison of Two Evolving Courts: The Canadian Supreme 
Court and the European Court of Justice, 5 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & PoL'Y 27, 44 (1999). It 
has also been noted that national judges in Europe approve of the Court's role because they see 
it as a way to increase their own power. /d. at 46. 
47. Bermann, supra note 38, at 353. 
48. Koopman, supra note 35, at 495 ("Experience of the last thirty years shows that legal 
integration is actually proceeding well, albeit at a slow pace."). 
49. KAREN J. ALTER, ESTABLISHING THE SUPREMACY OF EUROPEAN LAW I (2001). 
50. Mark Killian Brewer, Note, The European Union and Legitimacy: Time for a Euro-
pean Constitution, 34 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 555 (2001) (citing relevant cases and authorities). 
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whether the E.U. regulation violated German "basic law."51 The ECJ re-
sponded: "[T]he validity of a Community measure or its effect within a 
Member State cannot be affected by allegations that it runs counter to 
either fundamental rights as formulated by the constitution of that state or 
the principles of a national constitutional structure."52 It argued that even 
violations of fundamental human rights protected by a national constitu-
tion cannot stand against E.U. law.53 The German Constitutional Court, 
however, ruled that E.U. law could not take precedence over fundamental 
rights guaranteed by Germany's basic law.54 In the second Solange case in 
1974, the German Constitutional Court softened its insistence on German 
sovereignty in the face of E.U. law.55 Still, the German Court made it 
clear that it retained the authority to determine whether E.U. law ade-
quately protected rights guaranteed by its constitution.56 In the third case, 
based on the new Treaty for European Union, the German Court adopted 
a new spirit of cooperation and moved closer to acceptance of a European 
legal order.57 
The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) provides experience 
in the evolution of supranational tribunals dealing with rights. 58 The proc-
ess begins by an individual alleging a violation of their human rights 
protected by the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedom (Conventiont to a quasi-judicial tri-
bunal, the European Commission on Human Rights. If negotiations fail, 
the Commission issues a decision determining whether the state party 
violated the Convention. The ECHR reviews the evidence and legal ar-
guments de novo, and renders a final decision.60 The ECHR acquires 
51. Article 234 of the E.U. TREATY, supra note 15, (former Article 177) authorizes any 
"court or tribunal of a member state" to request that the ECJ "give preliminary rulings" on in-
terpretations of E.U. law and on the validity of acts of E.U. institutions. Its purpose is to foster 
cooperation between the national courts and the ECJ. KoEN LENAERTS & KIRK ARTS, PRocE-
DURAL LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 18-19 (Robert Bray ed., 1999). Indeed, it has made the 
national courts active partners in the European law regime. 
52. Case 11170, Intemationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr-und Vorratsstelle fiir 
Getreide und Futterrnittel, 1970 E.C.R. 1125, 1135 ( 1970). 
53. Id. at 1133-39. 
54. BERNARD RUDDEN, BASIC COMMUNITY CASES 68 (1987). 
55. See JULIANE KOKOTT, REPORTING ON GERMANY, IN THE EUROPEAN COURTS AND 
NATIONAL COURTS-DOCTRINE AND JURISPRUDENCE: LEGAL CHANGE IN ITS SOCIAL CON-
TEXT 89-90 (Anne-Marie Slaughter et al. eds., 1998). 
56. Brewer, supra note 50, at 572. 
57. However, true federalization of Europe is still a work in progress: "So lange ill again 
proved that the European Communities essentially remain an inter-governmental institution in 
which the Member States retain ultimate control over the European Court of Justice." /d. at 574. 
58. Helfer & Slaughter, supra note I, at 294. 
59. Nov. 4, 1950,213 U.N.T.S. 222. 
60. See P. VAN 0IJK & G.J.H. VAN HOOF, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN 
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS !93-266 (3d ed. 1998). 
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jurisdiction if either the Commission or the defending state party appeals 
(an individual may not appeal).61 States undertake in the treaty to abide by 
the decision, but the legal effect they give the Court's judgment varies 
considerably. The rate of compliance by states is nonetheless extremely 
h. h 62 Ig . 
The ECHR's road to effectiveness should guide a global rights tribu-
nal. 63 The first factor that has increased its influence is the Court's 
willingness to find for individual litigants against their state and its ability 
to broadcast its performance in that regard. The second factor has been its 
ability to mobilize its users and consumers, individuals and their lawyers, 
voluntary associations and nongovernmental organizations.64 A third cru-
cial factor is demonstrable neutrality.65 
Nonetheless, the relationship between the ECHR and its member 
states has made it somewhat less of a force than the ECJ. In recognition 
of which, the ECJ has been required since the Amsterdam Treaty to apply 
human rights standards as set out in the Convention to the E.U. institu-
tions and member states.66 The ECJ has not found itself bound by ECHR 
decisions, but it refers to them in reaching its own rights-related judg-
ments.67 In addition to ECHR rulings, the ECJ looks to the constitutions 
and principles of the member states for human rights standards.68 In short, 
the ECJ, despite its trade portfolio, has become an active rights enforcer. 
Both the U.S. and the E.U. demonstrate the interaction between a 
centralizing legal regimes and that of their constituent parts. These ex-
periences are instructive because the global judicial regime will force 
national legal cultures to deal· with a complex matrix in which various 
existing national and global legal principles interact. The ECJ has served 
as a battleground for competing national laws of its member states. In AM 
& S Europe v. Commission, a British company refused to provide certain 
documents ordered by the Commission, citing legal privilege, an absolute 
privilege under English common law.69 E.U. regulations involved in the 
61. The Court notes, however, "that the Court should have knowledge of and, if need be, 
take into consideration, the Applicant's point of view." !d. at 229-30. 
62. Helfer & Slaughter, supra note I, at 296. 
63. /d.at311. 
64. !d. at 312. 
65. Helfer and Slaughter list several other factors that might contribute to empowering a 
global rights court. /d. at 314-28. 
66. Elizabeth F. Defeis, Human Rights and the European Union: Who Decides? Possible 
Conflicts Between the European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights, 19 
DICK. 1. INT' L L. 30 I, 306 (200 I). 
67. Case 2/94, Re: The Accession of the Community to the European Human Rights 
Convention, 1996 E.C.R. 1763, 2 C.M.L.R. 265 ( 1996). 
68. Defeis, supra note 66, at 317. 
69. Case 155/79, AM & S Europe Limited v. Commission of the European Communities, 
1982 E.C.R. 1575, 1579. 
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Commission's order made no mention of legal professional privilege, but 
it did provide detailed provisions on investigation procedures. When the 
case came to the ECJ, British legal professionals gave support to the 
company, while the French government, which was not otherwise in-
volved in the case, offered support to the Commission.70 The French 
government argued that a member state's criminal law principle could not 
be extended into administrative law. After hearing multiple arguments, the 
ECJ ultimately decided to recognize the principle of protection of confi-
dentiality. This is a clear example of the interaction of national laws in the 
formation of a broadly applicable law developed by supranational judicial 
bodies. 
Slaughter observed both the "vertical" relations and "horizontal" rela-
tions among national and supranational courts.71 That is, supranational 
tribunals necessarily look to the law of its members, and whether the law 
that the supranational tribunals devised, ultimately affected the law of its 
members. The legal development moves "up" and "down" the suprana-
tional legal regime, as it has in both the U.S. and the E.U. In addition, 
however, the practical legal interaction required by participation in a su-
pranational regime leads to borrowing and revision among national legal 
cultures. Even the U.S. Supreme Court, "regarded by many foreign 
judges and lawyers as resolutely parochial," has increasingly observed 
foreign principles.72 This supranational interaction introduces a new com-
plexity into national law. 
Against the U.S. and E.U. experiences as a basis for forming a future 
global legal culture is the undeniable fact that there is much greater diver-
sity among the world players, even just the substantial players, than faced 
the U.S. goal of a "more perfect union" or the European goal of "an ever 
closer union." The WTO encompasses a plethora of trade related legal 
cultures. Perhaps even more daunting is the emotional and philosophical 
70. Koopmans, supra note 35, at 498-99. 
71. See generally Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 1103, 
1112 (2000) (leading to an emerging "judicial comity"). 
72. /d. at 1118 (led by Justices Breyer, O'Connor, and Chief Justice Rehnquist). The 
acceptance of international law into U.S. domestic law is growing. Paust, supra note 21, at 791. 
The acceptance of E.U. review principles into the English, i.e. common law, legal culture might 
presage an increasing impact of globalization on U.S. national review law. The change in judi-
cial attitude in England attributed to the duty to enforce E.U. law is considered dramatic. 
WILLIAM WADE & CHRISTOPHER fORSYTH, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 15 (7th ed. 1994). Conti-
nental review principles themselves are also finding their way into English law. See ROBERT 
THOMAS, LEGITIMATE EXPECTATIONS AND PROPORTIONALITY IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (2000). 
"[The pressure to apply E.U.law] may create an osmotic or 'spill-over' effect of European law, 
whereby principles which need only be applied by the national court when it is concerned with 
Community law may nevertheless filter through into the court's elaboration of domestic law." /d. 
at 39. Whether borrowing is conscious or not, the general continental usage of the principle no 
doubt provides legitimacy to arguments for its adoption in England. 
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melange of rights thinking that face a global rights judicial regime.73 Re-
member, however, that Europeans came together within about a decade of 
having been killing each other in record numbers with the two of the ma-
jor combatants forming the founding core. Nor are Europeans so 
homogeneous.74 Religious and ethnic wars are a constant in European 
history. Its legal cultures are far from homogeneous. 75 The U.S. encom-
passes an even greater ethnic and cultural mix, although few of these can 
claim dominance over any geographic or political unit, and it found uni-
fication an advantage in both trade and rights over time. 
On the other hand, considerable commonality exists in the world, at 
least, the legal world.76 While the world offers more diversity than either 
the E.U. or the U.S., their experience predicts that unified judicial regimes 
will generate a common legal culture in trade and rights.77 The experi-
ences in the U.S. and Europe provide some confidence that a global 
judicial regime will be able to adjust in both trade and rights. A global 
legal culture in both areas is possible, and judicial body or bodies will be 
effective in confronting and evolving the necessary legal cultures. The key 
will be identifying foundational principles acceptable to most member 
nations and their citizens. 
73. Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 1, at 363. 
74. Mark Killian Brewer, supra note 50, at 563-64 (asserting that Europeans are not a 
cohesive group bound together by culture, language, or other factors). 
75. Koopmans, supra note 35, at 493 (stating, while contrasting the relative cohesion of 
the U.S. with Europe, that, "In the European Community, the legal systems of the Member 
States are not only quite dissimilar, but some of them have even given origin to legal traditions 
which belong to the great legal traditions of the world"). 
76. A global legal culture ultimately must fold in other legal cultures. At present, 1.2 
billion Muslims seem particularly antagonistic to transatlantic culture in general. ENCYCLOPE-
DIA BRITANNICA BOOK OF THE YEAR (2003). They are covered by Islamic law, "Sharia," in 
some form, and for many it is the dominant or sole legal system. This antagonism might seem 
an obvious counterexample to a commonality claim, but Bernard Lewis argued that the conflict 
between Islam and the transatlantic society is not due to lack of common understanding. He 
observed: 
Islam and Christendom had a great shared inheritance, which drew on common 
sources: the science and philosophy of Greece, the law and government of Rome, the 
ethical monotheism of Judea, beyond all of them, the deeply rooted cultures of the 
ancient Middle East .... True, they denounce each other as infidels, but in so doing, 
they reveal their essential similarity, even kinship. 
BERNARD LEWIS, CULTURES IN CONFLICT: CHRISTIANS, MUSLIMS, AND JEWS IN THE AGE OF 
DISCOVERY 14-15 (1995). On the other hand, De Seif observed: "Great cultural differences exist 
among various areas inhabited by Muslims .... The fact is that, despite this idealized concept 
[of solidarity], relations between Muslims differs little from relations between Christians, as 
shown by the internecine struggles .... " RODOLPHE J.A. DE SElF, THE SHAR'IA: AN INTRO· 
DUCTION TO THE LAW OF ISLAM 6 (1994). 
77. See VERNON VALENTINE PALMER, MIXED JURISDICTIONS WORLDWIDE 31 (2001) 
(confirming convincingly that a culture might adopt the useful legal system of a historically 
antagonistic culture by the fact that Israel adopted German civil law). 
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C. Major Aspects ofthe E.U.-U.S.lmpact 
on a Global Legal Culture 
19 
As observed above, the global legal culture will be based on an 
amalgam of the world's legal and governmental cultures. For the foresee-
able future, legal development will be dominated by U.S. concepts, 
representing the common law world and the presidential government 
model, and the E.U., representing the civil law tradition and the parlia-
mentary government system. This foundation is predictable not only 
because these two transatlantic authorities, and the legal and governmen-
tal cultures they represent, will dominate at least this early stage, but 
because these cultures have migrated around the world, forming in some 
ways two fundamental models for legal and governmental institutions. 
Combined, civil law and common law-based legal cultures cover over 
70% of the world's population in over 62% of the jurisdictions.78 Simi-
larly, most modem governments follow either the presidential or 
parliamentary models, or some hybrid, and as will be discussed, these 
governmental models will affect the emerging legal culture. In sum, 
global legal culture will reflect a merger of civil and common law princi-
ples as transmuted in these two legal and governmental cultures. 
E.U. legal principles, despite U.K. membership, are founded on the 
civil law model.79 As would be expected, it relied largely on the laws of 
France and Germany. 80 The precursor of German law was the Prussian 
civil code, the first civil code ever established.81 The original French code, 
however, is considered the model for civil law systems.82 In short, E.U. 
law is only one step removed from the bedrock of the civil law system 
and, hence, represents that system on the world stage. 
The civil law model has spread throughout the world and now covers 
over half of the world's population.83 Its reception by other cultures is 
well-documented. Generally, it has been a device, as it was in France, for 
breaking with traditional law and government. 84 However, it is not 
78. University of Ottawa, supra note 3, at 3. 
79. See MARTIN VRANKEN, FUNDAMENTALS OF EUROPEAN CIVIL LAW AND IMPACT OF 
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 49 (1997). 
80. See JURGEN SCHWARZE, EUROPEAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 3 (1992). 
81. THOMAS GLYN WATKIN, AN HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO MODERN CIVIL LAW 
132-33 (1999) (explaining that while the Prussian code, sponsored by Frederick the Great, is 
considered the first modem code, the code concept reaches back to Roman Jaw); see also 
JEAN-LOUIS HALPERIN, THE CIVIL CODE 2 (1996). 
82. WATKIN, supra note 81, at 146 ("The codification of Napoleon has ... had the most 
widespread impact upon the world at large"). Watkin also noted the influence of Germanic codi-
fications on the civil law tradition, as well. /d. 
83. See also University of Ottawa, supra note 3. See generally KONRAD ZwEIGERT & 
HEIN KOTZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 109 (Tony Wier trans., 3d ed. 1998). 
84. ZWEIGERT & K6TZ, supra note 83, at 143. 
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inherently revolutionary, and the German adoption, as discussed below, 
actually sought to enshrine traditional laws. 85 Each system that has 
adopted the civil law model has added its own character.86 Nonetheless, 
the French version serves as the prototypical model. 87 Its design had the 
most influence on the E.U. treaties.88 For that reason, it is used here to 
explore the global ramifications of an extension of the civil law model. 
The common law model has been adopted around the world, in over a 
quarter of the jurisdictions. This was less due to the result of a reform 
movement, and probably more because once "the sun never set on the 
British empire."89 As Glenn observed: 
The common law expanded throughout much of the world as a 
result of the British empire .... The result . . . was a kind of 
embedding of common law thinking in a large number of diverse 
societies around the world .... What has happened, generally, is 
the marriage of the idea of a common law with that of multiple 
nation-states, and the marriage has been at times a difficult one. 90 
Perhaps then, the formal adoption of the common law model signifi-
cantly understates the impact of common law thinking. 
The E.U. and U.S. experiences also differ in the allocation of judicial 
power over trade and rights. The two have followed divergent tracks con-
sistent with the U.S. and Continental European judicial structures. The 
U.S. rights-enforcing judicial regime was combined with its 
trade-unification regime, vested in the U.S. Supreme Court and the lower 
federal courts. Europe has a separate rights-enforcing judicial regime, the 
ECHR, while the ECJ adjudicates trade issues.91 The unification of the 
trade and the rights judicial regimes within a single global tribunal is 
clearly possible, but the European experience, at present, suggests an op-
posite outcome. The informal coordination between the European trade 
adjudicator, the ECJ, and the European rights adjudicator, the ECHR, im-
plies that the two global judicial regimes will increasingly work in 
tandem. At the very least, they will evolve an increasingly coordinated 
85. !d. 
86. See id. at 98-118. 
87. However, in the particulars, the German version has been most often adopted because 
it attempts detail, whereas the French code aims only atframework.Id. at 1~5. 147, 154. 
88. VRANKEN, supra note 79, at 49. 
89. University of Ottawa, supra note 3. 
90. H. PATRICK GLENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD: SUSTAINABLE DIVERSITY IN 
LAW 228-29 (2000). 
91. In 1989, the Court of First Instance was established to take on some of the workload. 
This Court has limited potential jurisdiction under Article 225, and even less actual jurisdiction 
as it is currently empowered. The ECJ has appellate authority over the Court of First Instance, 
and retains much of its original jurisdiction. E.U. TREATY, supra note 36, art. 225. 
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global legal culture with both fundamental components. On the other 
hand, U.S. lawyers are likely to at least instinctively favor unification, 
because they are accustomed to a single federal court system handling 
both. Our reflection does not require a clear commitment to either devel-
opment. 
These two models, and the entire supranational legal enterprise, as-
sume a commitment to liberal democracy. Helfer and Slaughter argue 
that, "The European experience of supranational adjudication is the ex-
perience of two supranational tribunals [the ECJ and ECHR] operating 
within a community of liberal democracies with strong domestic com-
mitments to the rule of law."92 They assert that a commitment to liberal 
democracy is necessary for the commitment to (peaceful) supranational 
adjudication. At this point, general global commitment to liberal democ-
racy seems plausible. Hence, that condition ought to be fulfilled. 
The political models that form the foundation of liberal democracy 
will also affect the development of a global judicial regime. Of course, 
the E.U. and U.S. also represent the two dominant types of democratic 
government: the parliamentary and presidential models. These two gov-
ernmental models incorporate the courts in quite different ways. That 
difference will have to be "negotiated" in evolving a global judicial re-
gime. The overarching difference, with the most impact on the courts, is 
the different sense of proper "separation of powers." The presidential 
model separates the two political functions, legislative and executive, with 
the judiciary acting as a coordinate branch. The parliamentary model 
separates the judiciary from the unified political functions. The U.S. gov-
ernment, of course, is presidential. The E. U. combines parliamentary 
governments, so that its instincts and its citizens' understanding of gov-
ernment begin with the parliamentary model and its vision of the courts.93 
The separation of the judiciary from social policy decisions in parliamen-
tary government reinforces a similar civil law philosophy. As will be 
discussed, the judicial role in government in the presidential system, as 
opposed to the parliamentary system, will be a source of ideological more 
than structural tension in the global regime. 
92. Helfer & Slaughter, supra note I, at 331. 
93. However, the E.U. may embody more of a presidential-model sense of separation of 
powers. Francesca E. Bignami, The Democratic Deficit in European Community Rulemaking: A 
Call for Notice and Comment in Comitology, 40 HARV. lNT'L L.J. 451, 468-69 (1999) ("Meth-
ods of holding administration accountable in parliamentary systems offer little guidance for the 
Community. In Brussels, unlike national systems, the legislative principle is divided .... United 
States institutions can contribute to the Community administrative reform debate because in the 
United States as well a divided lawmaking principal must hold the administration accountable.") 
(emphasis added). 
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The E.U. and the U.S. are constantly dealing with the tension be-
tween nationalism and centralization. Alter summed up the evolution of 
the European shift in sovereignty: 
The transformation of the European legal system is no longer 
seen as controversial. The incredible success of the ECJ makes it 
hard to imagine a European Union where European law is not 
supreme over national law. But ... member states intended to 
create a limited legal system so as to protect national sover-
• 94 
e1gnty. 
Still, the E.U., despite pressure for an ever-closer union, has not been 
immune from the devolution movement. The E.U. has embodied its no-
tion of this conflict in the doctrine of "subsidiarity." The doctrine of 
subsidiarity expresses a growing sense that the E. U. was detracting from 
members' authority beyond that intended or wished by its members and 
their citizens.95 In short, it expresses a preference for social policy deci-
sion-making at the level closest to those who will be affected while still 
achieving the desired shared goal. Article 5 now expressly provides that: 
In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the 
Community shall take action, in accordance with the principle of 
subsidiarity, only if and insofar as the objectives of the proposed 
action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and 
can therefore ... be better achieved by the Community.96 
The E.U. "federalism" controversy is very familiar to U.S. lawyers. 
In U.S. constitutional law, the two sides in this debate are represented by 
the "nationalist," advocating a strong federal authority, and "federalist," 
supporting a considerable retention of authority by the states.97 This con-
94. ALTER, supra note 49, at 183. 
95. The doctrine began to emerge in the early 1980's from several different venues. The 
1992 "Maastricht Treaty," formally the Treaty on European Union (TEU), incorporated the 
concept into basic law. For a discussion of the Amsterdam Treaty's treatment of subsidiarity and 
the experience with that principle between the TEU and the Amsterdam Treaty, see Christian 
Timmermans, Subsidiarity and Transparency, 22 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 106, 127 (1999) (con-
cluding that "Judge Pescatore ... feared that subsidiarity would set us back into the dark times 
of anarchy of the nation states. I am happy to say now in 1998 that after five years of subsidiar-
ity, the Community is still very much alive"). 
96. E.U. TREATY, supra note 36, art. 5. 
97. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Ideologies of Federal Courts Law, 74 VA. L. REV. 
1141 (1988). 
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flict has raged since the Constitutional Convention.98 As in the E.U., uni-
fication and localism ebb and flow. 99 
U.S. federalism and E.U. subsidiarity contrast in interesting ways that 
might shape any predictions about the future of shared authority between 
the global regime and its national members. Bermann distinguished the 
two concepts in this way: "U.S. federalism places greater emphasis on the 
presence of an overall balance of power between the federal government 
and the states than on respect for any single rule for allocating compe-
tences among the different levels of government." 100 U.S. federalism 
principles may look to an array of justifications for centralized deci-
sion-making in a particular area of public policy. The federal government 
may decide that a solution should be sought at the national level without 
having to formally justify that choice. Subsidiarity focuses only on "the 
relative capacities of federal and state government to deal effectively or 
adequately with the problem or policy at hand." 101 Subsidiarity is a formal 
restraint in which the central government may take action only if it can 
demonstrate that it is the best actor; otherwise, the solution to a perceived 
problem must be left to the local authority. Therefore, E.U. subsidiarity 
places the burden on the E. U. institutions, including the E. U. Court, to 
demonstrate that centralization is superior, whereas U.S. federalism al-
lows the political institutions to make the choice. E.U. subsidiarity then 
both empowers a reviewing court to restrain central authority and re-
strains the central adjudicative bodies from themselves asserting power. 
U.S. federalism inhibits judicial interference in centralization of a solu-
tion, but only if it attempts to circumvent legitimate political judgments. 
All of these E.U.-U.S. governmental experiences assist in developing 
a framework for envisioning the future of a global legal culture. They 
show the process toward some degree of centralization, and the legal rela-
tionships between central authorities and their sovereign units. They show 
the role likely played by the adjudicating tribunals of the central authority, 
and the tensions that role creates. These sources help us envision similar 
evolution in global government and the role of global tribunals. We move 
then to laying the foundation for contemplating that future. 
98. See generally JAMES F. SIMON, WHAT KIND OF NATION: THOMAS JEFFERSON, JOHN 
MARSHALL, AND THE EPIC STRUGGLE TO CREATE A UNITED STATES (2002). 
99. Recently, the U.S. Supreme Court has tipped the law towards regionalism. See, e.g., 
Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports 
Auth., 535 U.S. 743 (2002). 
100. Hermann, supra note 38, at 450. 
10 I. I d. at 451. 
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II. CIVIL LAW THINKING IN A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 
This Part has two interrelated goals. First, I expect that most of the 
readers of this work will have only limited knowledge of basic civil law 
principles. Thus, this section tries to provide an overview of civil law 
thinking. Second, in order to do so in a way that moves the inquiry for-
ward, it also attempts to identify some major issues that might arise as 
those concepts are incorporate into a global legal culture. These observa-
tions anticipate the discussion in Part III, in which the civil law meets 
common law thinking on the world's legal stage. While a common law 
scholar might seem a curious person to attempt these objectives, I might 
claim both an advantage in explaining civil law concepts to common law 
readers and in anticipating outsiders' reaction to those concepts as they 
might be brought forward into the global arena. 
A. The Concept of a "Code" 
It is well recognized that the keystone of the civil law system is "the 
code." The concept of the code, however, is much more ideological than 
common lawyers recognize. In approaching the civil law, common law-
yers must dismiss the popular distinction that civil law is statutory law as 
opposed to judge-made common law. As Merryman in his famous guide 
to the civil law for U.S. lawyers wrote: 
The distinction between legislative and judicial production of law can 
be misleading. There is probably at least as much legislation in force in a 
typical American state as there is in a typical European or Latin American 
nation .... The authority of legislation [in the U.S.] is superior to that of 
judicial decisions; statutes supersede contrary judicial decisions (constitu-
tional questions aside), but not vice versa .... If, however, one thinks of 
codification not as a form but as the expression of an ideology, and if one 
tries to understand that ideology and why it achieves expression in code 
form, then one can see how it makes sense to talk about codes .... 102 
The first step, then, is to explore the ideology expressed by the code 
oriented strategy. 
The need for this understanding is particularly acute because suprana-
tional legal principles will necessarily evolve from multinational 
agreements. Civil lawyers will approach both the drafting and interpreta-
tion of those basic agreements as they might a code. 103 The E. U. treaties 
102. JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE 
LEGAL SYSTEMS OF WESTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 26-27 (2d ed. 1985). 
103. There may also be added pressure for more code-like legislation in the common law 
Member States of organizations such as the E.U. For example, there has been a great deal of 
debate over the possibility of criminal and commercial codes in England, though many English 
legal scholars are opposed to such ideas. See Lord Goff of Chieveley, The Future of the Com-
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support this conclusion. 104 Vranken notes that, "Similarities exist between 
the 1957 Treaty of Rome ... and the 19th century codes, in particular the 
French Code Civil. The Treaty is a framework treaty (traite cadre): it lays 
down a grand design only. Yet somehow the treaty can make the same 
claim to comprehensiveness as a civil code."105 This similarity is far from 
a surprise because civil law drafters instinctively conceived of their mis-
sion as creating a European code. More to the point, one can expect civil 
lawyers to seek to fashion global agreements with the same instincts, and 
they will view the final product as if it were a code. What does this mean? 
1. Objective in Resort to a Code System 
The civil law ideology grew out of an experience that taught that 
courts might be the most dangerous branch, and certainly not inherently 
the least dangerous. 106 This principle belief began with the French ancien 
regime, in which the "Parlements," or regional courts, were oppressive 
and corrupt instruments of bourgeois authority, and frequently served as 
an instrument for royal repression. 107 Constraining judicial abuses was the 
goal of the code, and that goal pervades through civil law thinking. It is 
how the courts are constrained, however, that is the key to understanding 
the civil law ideology. 
Because of this experience, the separation of powers between majori-
tarian government, the legislative process, and the judicial function is a 
fundamental objective of the code. 108 While recognizing three functions, 
law making, law implementing, and law interpreting, it strives to insulate 
the legislative (law making) function from the judicial. 109 This govern-
mental objective conforms to the parliamentary model in which civil law 
systems reside. That model combines the executive and legislative in that 
mon Law, 46 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 745,750 (1997) ("Since English commercial law seems to be 
so widely used and English commercial lawyers seem to be so widely consulted, why worry 
about a commercial code?''). 
104. The current iteration of the E.U. treaties is at least as much constitutional in nature. 
Indeed, the E.U. treaties are now generally considered a de facto constitution. Brewer, supra 
note 50, at 559 n.2l. Also, E.U. members are committed to developing an actual constitution in 
the near future. The Laeken European Council, Laeken Declaration-The Future of the Euro-
pean Union, Dec. 15, 2001, available at http://europa.eu.int/futururnldocuments/offtext/ 
docl51201-en.htm. Still, they retain a code-like nature as well. 
I 05. VRANKEN, supra note 79, at 49. 
106. JOHN P. DAWSON, THE ORACLES OF THE LAW 431 (1968). 
107. ANDREW WEST ET. AL., THE FRENCH LEGAL SYSTEM 142 (2d ed. 1998) ("TheRe-
public has traditionally been wary of the power of the judiciary. This distrust is rooted in the 
way the Parlements of the Ancien Regime abused their position and interfered in politics."). 
I 08. Bernard Rudden, Courts and Codes in England, France and Soviet Russia, 48 TuL. 
L. REv. 1010, 1012 (1974) ("The courts, however, may not make law. This prohibition stems 
from the doctrine of separation of powers ... "). 
109. RAYMOND YOUNGS, ENGLISH, FRENCH & GERMAN COMPARATIVE LAW 8 (1998). 
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the legislative branch forms the executive leadership and is ultimately 
controlled by it. Thus, both the civil law model and the parliamentary 
model seek protection of democratic law making and implementing func-
tions from an elite judiciary. 
In their seminal comparative law explanation, David and Brierley at-
tribute this division in some degree to all the systems in the entire 
"Romano-Germanic family." The tendency is both traditional and natural: 
Given the present unfailing tendency of jurists in all countries to 
look for support in a text of law, the creative role of judicial deci-
sions is always, or nearly always, hidden behind the screen of an 
'interpretation' of legislation. It is exceptional for jurists to aban-
don this habit or for judges to admit frankly that they have the 
power of creating rules. They persist in their attitude of obedience 
to enacted law, even when the legislature itself has recognized 
that they may be gaps in the legislation .... 
Whatever the contribution of the courts to the evolution of the 
law, it certainly differs, therefore, from that of the legislators in 
countries of the Romano-Germanic family. Legislators, who 
nowadays are called upon to establish the framework of the legal 
order, do so by formulating commands and creating rules of law. 
Very rarely are courts authorised to use this method .... save a 
few possible exceptions which, while undoubtedly interesting, 
leave the principle intact nevertheless. 110 
Thus, the civil law actors adhere to this separation of functions, but 
the impact on the legal culture is subtle. 
This parliamentary, civil law vision of separation of powers is likely 
to guide the global judiciary. First, civil law nations dominate the global 
arena, and civil law public law principles do not seem to give way to 
common law principles. 111 Second, most nations have some form of par-
liamentary system with a strong legislative concept. Third, and perhaps 
more important, the global participants will not trust an activist and free 
wheeling judiciary. 
Interestingly, despite the fact that most E.U. members have a civil law 
legal culture, and all have a parliamentary form of government (although 
some have a "hybrid"), the ECJ has been quite activist. Yet, it is unlikely 
110. RENE DAVID & JOHN E.C. BRIERLEY, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD To-
DAY: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE LAW 123 (2d ed. 1978). 
Ill. In hybrid systems, public law is where the mix happens. PALMER, supra note 77, at 
9-10 ("One searches in vain for a system where continental law predominates in the public 
sphere while Anglo-American law dominates the private."). 
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that such activism will be acceptable on the global stage. The WTO Ap-
pellate Body's decision in EC-Measures Affecting Livestock and Meat 
Products (Hormones), 112 illustrates this concern. In EC-Hormones, the 
Appellate Body admonished the Panel for imposing procedures on the 
parties that did not have a foundation in the treaty's text. It was very con-
cerned over the Panel's lack of respect for an agreement that WTO 
Members consented to as a framework for guidance. Thus, the tradition of 
civil law coupled with the tendency of global institutions to reject judicial 
activism indicates the separation of legislative and judicial functions will 
likely persist into any global legal system. 
2. Natural Law 
The place of natural law is historically significant, and hence is im-
portant in understanding the instincts of civil law philosophy. Zweigert 
and Kotz explained it as such: 
As a matter of intellectual history it is clear that the Code as 
whole would never have existed but for the idea of codification 
which comes from natural law. Furthermore the [French] Code 
Civil is based on the tenet of natural law that there are autono-
mous principles of nature, quite independent of religious belief, 
from which one can infer a system of legal rules which, if given 
intelligible form according to a plan, can act as the basis for an 
orderly, reasonable, and moral life in society. 113 
Thus, civil law is founded on what is called "secular naturallaw."114 
Understanding the civil law ideology requires the recognition that 
somewhere in at least the subconscious of the civil law is the ghost of 
natural law. Yet, modem jurisprudence worldwide has much less respect 
for the concept of natural law, even as a legitimate evolutionary root. 
Even civilians have questioned the propriety of founding a legal system in 
the notion of natural law, although perhaps they cannot totally distance 
themselves from some visceral imperative."5 Nonetheless, whatever they 
now believe about universal principles, civil law is imbued with natural 
law reasoning. 
The civil law's natural law orientation will affect its impact on the 
global stage, where other cultures will cling to their own set of universal 
112. WTO Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Measures Concerning Meat 
and Meat Products (Hormones), WTO Doc. WT/DS26/AB!R, DSR 1998: I 135, '1!181 (Feb. 13, 
1998). 
113. 
114. 
115. 
ZWEIGERT & KOTZ, supra note 83, at 88. 
MERRYMAN, supra note 102, at 18-19. 
See WATKIN, supra note 81, at 139. 
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principles. 116 It will be hard to negotiate these differences in global tribu-
nals because they are based on cultural experience and tradition. Thus, the 
more civilians seem attached to a natural law the more controversy will 
revolve around fundamental principles. It is well accepted that negotiation 
is most likely to breakdown when fundamental principles are at stake. In 
short, disagreement over the very existence of natural law can be expected 
to be one source of tension if the civil law model is adopted on a global 
level. 
Indeed, even the notion of legal secularism will be questioned in 
many legal cultures. What is known as the jus commune, the sources of 
civil law, includes canon, i.e. catholic, law along with Roman and local 
law. 117 Although to a large extent the code approach was intended to free 
the legal culture from religious principles, the resulting code was imbued 
with them. It will be important for participants to recognize the potential 
religious undertones of any disagreements between applying the princi-
ples of civil law and other legal cultures. 
3. Rationalizing the Law 
The philosophical context from which the civil code emerges justified 
a scientific approach to law making and development. Indeed, Merryman 
observed that, "[Civil law scholars] deliberately and conscientiously 
sought to emulate natural scientists."118 The codes are the product of the 
"Age of Reason." "The civil codes are premised on the belief that life is 
not full of random events, but rather that there is order." 119 Therefore, the 
civil law instinctively perceives the law as a subject of scientific study and 
formulation. 120 Starting with that conception of the law, it seemed quite 
reasonable that a small body of experts, called "jurists," should lay the 
foundation of the legal culture. 121 
A substantial difference exists, however, between the French ap-
proach and the German approach. 122 The French code was revolutionary in 
that it sought to wipe away prior law and establish a new legal order; in 
contrast, the German code sought to adopt fundamental principles by sci-
entific study of the historical context of existing German law. The French 
code writers thus set out to discover, though science, a set of 'best princi-
116. Indeed, U.S. law incorporates natural law principles, such as the rights of man, as 
much as we would like to deny it. MERRYMAN, supra note 102, at 16-17. 
117. !d. at ll-12. 
118. /d. at 62. 
119. VRANKEN, supra note 79, at 35. 
120. F.H. LAWSON, A COMMON LAWYER LOOKS AT THE CiVIL LAW 76 (1955). 
121. "Jurist" means an "academic lawyer." VRANKEN, supra note 79, at 44 ("Both the 
French and German civil codes were the product of a small team of people."). 
122. See MERRYMAN, supra note 102, at 28-33. 
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pies,' whereas the German "historical school" opposed a code devised by 
reasoning due to philosophical principles. Nonetheless, the two civil law 
models share a desire for rationality and a scientific approach to the law. 
Just as it is not fruitful today to assert universal principles of law, the 
world may also be skeptical of a neutral, scientific approach to its legal 
system. 123 First, agreement on best principles is extremely difficult. While 
the search might be for some sort of principled consensus, that consensus 
will result from a "negotiation" of legal traditions, rather than a scientific 
distillation of immutable axioms. Second, much of the science in the civil 
law system was historical, the derivation of law from ancient "wise" 
cultures. History and social traditions are not universal, and other, 
non-transatlantic societies will look to their own "wise" cultures. 
Moreover, the "wise" cultures have lost much of their gloss, particularly 
the ones upon which the code is founded. 
Still, the objective rationality of civil law may find acceptance in the 
global legal culture. Legal consensus cannot be developed from a "town 
meeting," even of representatives of legal cultures. Rather, the global 
"legislation" will necessarily be the work of a body of persons charged 
with developing its framework. Many of these individuals will be jurists, 
instinctively trying to find and incorporate the "best" ideas. The structured 
adaptation and creativity of the civil law system may be compatible with 
the evolution of the law in the global arena. 
4. A Code is a Framework 
Whatever its philosophical roots may be, the overarching strategy of 
any code is to create a framework for society. The framework seeks the 
smallest possible number of elements; it seeks what the civil law jurist 
Jhering called an "economy of juristic concepts."124 The degree to which 
this strategy is adhered to varies among codes. Nonetheless, the object of 
any code is to provide this foundational framework for the legal culture. 125 
It is a launching pad from which judicial decisions and legislation spring. 
It seeks at once to be concise, straightforward, and universal. 126 
Given the philosophical difference, it is not surprising that the French 
and German code differ in this respect. The French code was to be so 
123. For an English perspective, see Goff, supra note 103, at 760 ("Let us therefore con-
tinue to worship at the shrine of the working hypothesis, and continue too to contemplate the 
great idea with all the caution bred of common sense and our long experience."). 
124. LAWSON, supra note 120, at 67. 
125. For a common law perspective, see Goff, supra note 103, at 753 ("Continental law-
yers love to proclaim some great principle, and then knock it into shape afterwards. Instead the 
boring British want to find out first whether and, if so, how these great ideas are going to work 
in practice."). 
126. See LAWSON, supra note 118, at 79; see also VRANKEN, supra note 79, at 58. 
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simple and straightforward that lawyers would be unnecessary. In con-
trast, its precursor, the Prussian Ladrecht of 1794, attempted to be so 
detailed as to govern every possible situation. Even after the failure of this 
attempt, the drafters of the German code sought a much more detailed and 
technical document. Its code strategy incorporated a role for legal profes-
sionals. Still, the two code models aim at a framework around which the 
total legal system could be built. 
5. Symbol of Change and Unity 
Despite their different philosophies, the German and French models 
share fundamental code-related goals that have popularized them around 
the world. 127 They incorporate a sharp separation of powers doctrine in 
which the legislature makes the law and judges are prevented from doing 
so. Thus, codes represent an affirmation of majoritarian government. 
Also, since they are necessarily the product of nationalism, creating one 
law for an entire nation, codes performed (and continue to perform) a 
unifying function. It may be these characteristics that recommend the civil 
model to emerging states around the world. For these people, the code 
offers tangible commitment to democratic government, rather than gov-
ernment run by elites, and the expression of nationhood. 
These characteristics make civil law ideology particularly attractive to 
the global legal culture. Globalization will instinctively drive toward uni-
fication, and a code is an effective technique for centralization. The 
code-like use of the treaties forming the E. U. demonstrates this unifying 
nature. 128 Multinational agreements resembling a generalized, or 
French-style, code, will no doubt play the role of the "code" in a more 
global context. 129 
6. Anticipated Interpretative Method as a Guide to Drafting 
The civil law system has developed sophisticated interpretative 
methods, and the anticipation of application of these techniques will af-
fect the drafting instincts of civil law system participants. For one thing, 
the civilian approach to language is consistent with the general interna-
tional law commitment to text. 130 The WTO Appellate Body decision in 
127. See MERRYMAN, supra note 102, at 32. 
128. The E.U. treaties' ambiguous nature has generated a caii for the creation of an actual 
European code. Ugo Mattei, Hard Code Now!, 2 GLOBAL JuRIST FRONTIERS I (2002). 
129. The founding treaties of supranational organizations naturally take on the character-
istics of a code. Undeniably, these agreements also have constitutional aspects. See Movsesian, 
supra note 10. A code is considered much more operational than a constitution. Nonetheless, as 
discussed below, constitutional interpretation and code interpretation have much in common. 
130. Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that, "A treaty 
shaH be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the 
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India-Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of Agricultural, Textile and 
Industrial Products demonstrates this instinct. 131 In India-Quantitative 
Restrictions, the Appellate Body expends much effort in interpreting the 
correct meaning of "thereupon." This illustrates the supranational organi-
zation's concern with remaining bound to the treaty text, as reflected in 
their judiciary's decisions. Thus, civil law participants, at least, will em-
bellish any global agreements and implementing multinational 
governments in much the same way as the codes have been embellished. 
The civil law incorporates a hierarchy of legislation. In civil law 
countries, there are both code provisions and statutes, and each has its 
own style. 132 Statutes tend to cover very specific subjects, and are drafted 
very specifically. Merryman describes these "microsystems" that revolve 
around the Code. 133 These microsystems are created by decidedly political 
legislative action, not the work of an impartial team of legal experts. 
Within the rnicrosystem are the executive actions and decrees. Such ad-
ministrative actions are important to the implementation of a code 
framework. 134 The code provisions tend to be more general in nature, and 
more stable than these embellishments. "Thus new legislation should em-
ploy the concepts and institutions and follow the organization established 
by the scholars and embodied in earlier systematic legislation."135 
A civilian will work with global legislation as frameworks in the na-
ture of a code. Even among civil law nations, however, the same 
provision has been given different meaning, evidencing, even among sys-
tems that show initial agreement, the pull of forces such as customary law 
and national experience. 136 Thus, it is important to remember that civilians 
will bring to the global arena, not agreement on specifics, but a common 
legal philosophy, an ideology that will deeply affect the global legal cul-
ture. Civil law-trained global judges may resist efforts to use sources 
other than the language of agreements to establish general principles. 
They may accept reference to other sources, including other judicial 
terms of the treaty in their context and in light of its object and purpose." Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 31(1), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 340 [hereinafter Vienna Con-
vention: Treaties]. But the Convention also allows modification by "subsequent practice." !d. at 
art. 31 (3)(b ). 
131. See generally WTO Appellate Body Report, India-Quantitative Restrictions on 
Imports of Agricultural, Textile and Industrial Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS90/AB/R, DSR 
1999:IV 1763, 1766-69, '11'11 11-24 (Sept. 22, 1999). 
132. The statutes represent the influence of common law countries, particularly the United 
States, on modem civil law countries. 
133. MERRYMAN, supra note 102, at 151-52. 
134. See id. at 154-55. The overshadowing of legislative policymaking by administrative 
action in modern society seems to be universally lamented but inevitable. 
135. !d. at 81. 
136. /d. at 142 (variety in rules). 
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opinions, but that acceptance must be carefully understood in the civil law 
context. 
In a code system, judicial interpretations are overshadowed by the 
interpretations of the scholars and academic lawyers called 'jurists." 
Scholars are a crucial source of interpretation. 137 Lawson stated bluntly 
that, "Civil law is inconceivable without the jurist." 138 Civilians will 
naturally assume that teams of experts will draft any global legal 
framework, and they will expect jurists to contribute significantly to 
future interpretation of that framework. 139 However, global judges 
themselves will rarely reflect the civil law model, and the civil law's 
reliance on academic decision makers will be met by resistance among 
world participants. The extent to which learned individuals receive 
deference will be a point of tension. 
B. Legal Dynamics in the Civil Law System 
A perception of the civil law system is that code interpretation is pro-
hibited, or at least closely constrained. True, at first, the French code 
drafting project thought to prohibit judicial interpretation and leave the 
legislature, as the democratic institution, to be the sole authority to evolve 
law from the code. But change and interpretation are inevitable, and code 
aficionados have no illusions that it could be otherwise. 140 Napoleon, 
himself, lamented shortly after the Code Civil came into effect: "The 
Code had hardly appeared when it was followed almost immediately, and 
as a supplement, by commentaries, explanations, developments, interpre-
tations, and what not .... " 141 Indeed, the original French code itself 
recognized the need for interpretation. 142 "Consequently there is general 
agreement in civil law jurisdictions that judges do have the power to in-
terpret evolutively." 143 Still, as Zweigert and Puttfarken observed, 
"Conspicuously lacking in civil law jurisprudence is a methodology of the 
judicial development of the law, a methodology which would analyze, 
137. /d. at 66. 
138. LAWSON, supra note 120, at 69. 
139. Two examples of this instinct translated into a supranational regime are the European 
Convention on Human Rights, VAN DIJK, supra note 60 (noting that once the decision to pro-
ceed was made, the participants appointed a "Committee of Government Experts.") and 
Belgium's efforts to empower the ICJ, Watson, supra note 23, at 11-12. 
140. HALPERIN, supra note 81, at 15 ("The Code's redactors were ... persuaded that such 
detail must remain the work of judges and commentators (jurisconsultes), and left a wide berth 
for judicial interpretation. Of course, article 5 of the Code forbids judicial decisions that aspire 
to legislative character (arrets de reglements)."). 
141. C.J. Friedrich, The Ideological and Philosophical Background, in THE CoDE NAPO-
LEON AND THE COMMON LAW-WORLD 15-16 (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1954). 
142. ZwEIGERT & K6TZ, supra note 83, at 89-90. 
143. MERRYMAN, supra note 102, at 46. 
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rationalize, and systematize the specific role of the judge in the process of 
finding and making law."144 The nature of the interpretative and evolution-
ary process serves as one of the premiere distinguishing characteristics of 
a code system. 
It starts with a literal or structured approach. This expresses an at-
mosphere or attitude: a real commitment to language, often called a 
"grammatical" approach. 145 The courts pay more than lip service to the 
idea that if the language is clear, they must apply that language. Even 
when the statute is ambiguous, a judge must stick to the statute. Of 
course, the language does not often compel an outcome. Indeed, a code 
based upon the French system, particularly, is rarely so specific. Under 
those circumstances, the court is to engage in "logical interpretation." De 
Cruz described the approach in this way: "If application of the grammati-
cal meaning approach suggests more than one possible interpretation, the 
text may be construed in accordance with the 'logical interpretation' ap-
proach."146 Applying the logical interpretation approach, a judge may 
construe the legislative provision not just on its stated terms, but with the 
context of the entire body of rules comprising the legal system, derived 
from the same statute, in other laws or from recognized general principles 
of law.147 
The overarching goal of the civil law system is legal certainty. 148 In a 
way, the German system serves this goal better because its code is more 
precise than the French code. Yet the French system may be moving in 
that direction. 149 The balance between predictability and the process of 
change in the civil law system is important to understanding the operation 
of that system. 
Certainty is guaranteed by the use of clear concepts. Clear concepts 
and principles provide elements of innumerable combinations designed to 
fit any particular situation. 150 The concepts move decision making ahead 
144. Konrad Zweigen & Hans-Jlirgen Puttfarken, Statutory Interpretation-Civilian Style, 
44 TuL. L. REv. 704, 715 (1970) ("From a common law point of view this must be the most 
astounding feature of civil law."). 
145. PETER DE CRUZ, COMPARATIVE LAW IN A CHANGING WORLD 267 (2d ed. 1999). 
However, "[i]f the text is unequivocal and can have only one meaning, but applying it would 
lead to absurdity or repugnance, both common law and civil law courts will disregard a statute's 
grammatical construction or plain meaning." /d. at 268. 
146. /d. 
147. See generally Mitchel de S.-0.-I'E. Lasser, "Lit. Theory" Put to the Test: A Com-
parative Literary Analysis of American Judicial Tests and French Judicial Discourse, Ill HARV. 
L. REV. 689 (1998). 
148. See VRANKEN, supra note 79, at 37 ("For the drafters of the French Code civil a 
direct relationship existed between their desire for legal certainty and the need to produce a 
comprehensive text."). 
149. !d. at 60. 
150. See LAWSON, supra note 120, at 66. 
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as in chess, according to clear and definite rules. 151 Civil law aims for sta-
bility of the platform or framework, but not total prohibition of change. 
As Merryman observed: "[Certainty] is an abstract legal value. Like a 
queen in chess, it can move in any direction." 152 
The drive for certainty emphasizes systemic values, which concen-
trate on definitions and classifications. Categorization may be seen as a 
kind of applied formalism. 153 But unlike an extreme formalism which ul-
timately generates strict rules, categorization disciplines without 
inhibiting development. Indeed, categorization can be extremely crea-
tive. 154 Developing the law to serve society is an important aspect of the 
civil law system, more important in theory than individual justice. 155 It 
attempts, however, to direct the mental process by which one evaluates or 
evolves ideas, and its mental discipline has a natural tendency towards 
ordering. 
Categorization structures experience and experimentation. The 
French jurist Tunc sought to explain this aspect of the civil law system: 
If there is a sentence which a French lawyer has great difficulty in 
understanding, it is Holmes' famous saying: 'The life of the law 
has not been logic: it has been experience.' It is questionable 
whether the opposition between logic and experience has any jus-
tification. Exact sciences are equally based on experience and on 
1 . 156 og1c. 
Indeed, categorization demands the reworking of classification with 
each new "sample" dispute resolution, which adds to the experience of 
law. Categorization recognizes that theory without application is empty 
and that application without order creates systemic chaos. Experience and 
theory are necessary partners in any progressive evolution of both practice 
and ideas. The categorization process does not slowly withdraw issues 
from reality as the rules become more wooden with use, a circumstance 
one might see with formalism. 157 Rather, categorization orders a creative 
decision-making process. 
151. /d. 
152. MERRYMAN, supra note 102, at 48. 
153. '"Fonnalism' describes legal theories that stress the importance of rationally uncon-
troversial reasoning in legal decision, whether from highly particular rules or quite abstract 
principles." Thomas Grey, Langdel/'s Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L. REv. I, 9 (1983). 
154. STEVEN JAY GOULD, WONDERFUL LIFE: THE BURGESS SHALE AND THE NATURE OF 
HISTORY 98 (1989) (implying that taxonomy can lead to very creative scientific development). 
155. See LAWSON, supra note 120, at 85. 
156. Andre Tunc, Methodology of the Civil Law in France, 50 TuL. L. REv. 459, 468 
(1976). 
157. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE 
L.J. 943, 1001 (1987) ("A nonbalancing approach ... does not require a court to be blind to the 
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Categorization is dynamic as well as creative. It is quite useful for 
adapting to new circumstances and new social problems. U.S. jurist Dun-
can Kennedy described the reciprocal nature of its developmental 
strategy, whereby practice influences the system of premises and the sys-
tem of premises influences practice. 158 As to its operational strategy, he 
explained that, "The basic mode of this influence of theory on results is 
that the ordering of myriad practices into a systematization occurs 
through simplifying and generalizing categories, abstractions that become 
the tools available when the practitioner Uudge or advocate) approaches a 
new problem."159 Categorization is a decisional tool that can incorporate 
all relevant values in the face of new circumstances. The dynamic and 
adaptive, yet necessarily applied, nature of categorization form out of the 
bounded creativity of the civil law model. 
The subtlety of this stable but dynamic approach to language may 
baffle non-civil lawyers on the global stage.160 Civil law participants in 
the global arena will seek to create and perceive the language as creating 
concepts. In individual application, they will expect the concepts in inter-
national agreements to remain constant, applied in a principled way 
dictated by that language. 161 Thus, tension over the manipulation of lan-
guage, not disagreement over its flexibility, is likely between civilians and 
non-civilians. 
consequences of constitutional rules or the social context in which constitutional rule or the 
social context in which constitutional questions arise."). 
158. Duncan Kennedy, Toward an Historical Understanding of Legal Consciousness: The 
Case of Classical Legal Thought in America, 1850-1940, 3 REs. LAW & Soc. 3, 8 (1980) 
("[Classical legal thought] is designed to tell us about the theoretical atmosphere within which 
practices occurred, and to tell us about the manner in which the theoretical atmosphere influ-
enced particular results."). 
159. 1d. (emphasis added). 
160. In an early case where English courts had to interpret and apply European Commu-
nity regulations, Lord Denning described the problems English judges face: 
What a task is thus set before us! The Treaty is quite unlike any of the enact-
ments to which we have become accustomed. The draftsmen of our statutes have 
striven to express themselves with the utmost exactness .... They have sacrificed 
style and simplicity .... 
How different is this treaty. It lays down general principles. It expresses its aims 
and purposes .... But it lacks precision .... An English lawyer would look for an 
interpretation clause, but he would look in vain. 
Bulmer Ltd. v. Bollinger S.A., All. Eng. Rep. 1226, 1237 (1974). 
161. Indeed, Palmer found that civilians may prefer the common law approach because it 
shows the adoption of common law principles. PALMER, supra note 77, at 46 ("Stare decisis 
may seem to be a needed check on judicial activism and provide safeguards against future ero-
sion [of the civil law character]."). 
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Civilians refer to the "teleological approach," interpretation according 
to adaptations of rapidly changing social or economic conditions. 162 The 
theory is that every code provision is considered a thread in one whole 
cloth. The significance of this strategy is that where there is an ambiguity 
in a code provision, the first place one looks is at other code provisions. 
Thus, judges in the civil law tradition can sometimes "read into" a code 
provision something, which is taken from another provision, which might, 
on its face, not seem terribly relevant. The result may not, however, be 
directly contrary to a conclusion derived directly from a grammatical or 
logical interpretation. It does not preclude contradiction by reference to 
legislative history, but original intent and legislative history are considered 
only after there is a determination that no answer can be found in the 
code. As Katz explained: "As regards the civil law, it is an overstatement 
to say that a code is always completely self-contained and therefore 
excludes all reference to any source of law other than itself."163 Global 
tribunals may also follow the teleological approach. 164 
The idea of individual interpretation in the civil law system is not so 
much to decide individual disputes but to anticipate broader solutions. 165 
"[A]t no time can individual cases be allowed to blur the broader pic-
ture."166 The code provides a stable platform from which to make these 
leaps into the future. This grants the courts a broad sort of discretion. 
Civil law decisions are expected to anticipate the future itself outside the 
context of the individual controversy. Predictability of legal implications 
for others in the same position is more important than the implications of 
the result for a particular individual, even if the rule is harsh in a specific 
case.
167 Within this design is accommodation for equity in individual ap-
plication. Consistent with the overarching strategy, the power to consider 
individual fairness must be delegated, although sometimes the delegation 
may be implicit. 168 Individual fairness must give way to legal certainty. 169 
162. DE CRuz, supra note 145, at 270. 
163. He in Kotz, Taking Civil Codes Less Seriously, 50 MODERN L. REV. I, II (1987) 
(emphasis added). 
164. For example, in WTO Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Measures 
Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, WTO Doc. WT/DSI35/AB/R (Mar. 12, 
2001), the WTO Appellate Body was forced to interpret the Agreement's numerous enunciations 
of "like products." See id. at 'II'll 96-98. In determining the correct definition, the Appellate Body 
noted that "the term 'like product' in Article III:4 must be interpreted to give proper scope and 
meaning to this principle. In short, there must be consonance between the objective pursued by 
Article III, as enunciated in the 'general principle' articulated in Article III: 1." /d. at 'II 98. 
165. LAWSON, supra note 120, at 80. 
166. VRANKEN, supra note 79, at 216. 
167. MERRYMAN, supra note 102, at 82. 
168. !d. at 52-53. 
169. !d. at71. 
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Accordingly, civil lawyers will expect supranational tribunals to individu-
alize according to these priorities. 
C. Courts and Judges 
Civil law courts tend to be specialized and hierarchical. 170 The judges 
direct their proceedings. Their structure expresses a commitment to ex-
pertise and intellectualization. Thus, the civil law depends on the 
intellectual capacity of its judges. German judges, in particular, are likely 
to seek learnedness in their opinions. 171 
Civil law judges are part of the civil service. 172 Judges enter a career 
of judging and advance through the judicial hierarchy. 173 They are edu-
cated and trained to be judges. In particular, their education and training 
equips them to work with language and to engage in the rational and sci-
entific finding of the law. They then gain experience as judges. The 
judicial hierarchy allows judicial authorities considerable control over 
lower level judges. 174 Opinions are anonymous and collegial. 175 They 
rarely become known outside the legal profession, and even there, they do 
not attain a special status. 176 Their training and experience creates an elite, 
if anonymous, corps of adjudicators. 
The same elite civil servants are not assured in the global judicial re-
gime. Global judges will come forward from national regimes. The 
international community will hope that judges will be experienced, pro-
fessional judges, but that is not now certain. Surely, they will not always 
have the training and experience that may be necessary to make the sys-
tem work as a civil law system. 
Civil law decision-making compels its own kind of fact-finding and 
record. Civil law judicial decision-making is supported by the "inquisito-
rial" procedures. The basic strategy of this procedural model is judicial 
control, in contrast to the "adversary" system, which bestows control 
upon the lawyers. At first blush, a judge-controlled process seems incon-
sistent with the basic distrust of courts. However, given the demands on 
civil law judges, they have a justifiable need for a record adequate to 
170. VRANKEN, supra note 79, at 58. 
171. ZWEIGERT & KOTZ, supra note 83, at 130. 
172. VRANKEN, supra note 79, at 62. 
173. ZWEIGERT & KOTZ, supra note 83, at 124. 
174. See J. MARK RAMSEYER & MINORU NAKAZATO, JAPANESE LAW: AN ECONOMIC 
APPROACH 17 (1999) ("This institutional structure radically shapes the incentives judges face: 
fundamentally it gives judges an incentive to act in those ways that the people deciding their 
transfers consider appropriate."). 
175. VRANKEN, supra note 79, at 62. 
176. ZWEIGERT & KOTZ, supra note 83, at 125. 
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perform those functions and for a broad range of advice, including expert 
legal advice. 
The ECJ provides a supranational adaptation of the judicial manage-
ment and expertise orientation of the civil law process. After the pleading 
stage, the parties' control virtually ends, and the court takes over. One of 
the judges is assigned the case and serves as a "judge-rapporteur," re-
sponsible for building the record. The rapporteur's report will serve as the 
basis for a decision. An independent judicial officer, the "Advocate Gen-
eral," then considers the case. The Advocate General is part of the court, 
and prepares an opinion to "assist" the Court. 177 Although the extent to 
which the court adopts the Advocate General's opinion may vary, it is 
invariably of extreme importance. 178 As Amull observed: "[M]ost students 
of the Court would probably say that it is fairly unusual-although by no 
means unheard of-for the Court to depart from the Opinion of its Advo-
cate General and there are reasons for believing that, whether or not an 
Opinion is followed, the judges find it helpful."179 
The global tribunals might do well to borrow both the preparatory 
judge and the Advocate General function from the ECJ. The preparatory 
judges, as they do in the civil law process, balance out the inequality of 
representation and assure that the court has the record it needs. The 
ECJ-style Advocate General would provide expert support for global 
judges of varying training and ability. Such a permanent and impartial 
advisor to a global tribunal could also assure some certainty and uniform-
ity among tribunals representing diverse judicial characteristics. 180 
177. E.U. TREATY, supra note 36, art. 222. 
178. Advocates General seem to borrow from some common law reasoning in their opin-
ions, citing prior decisions as binding authority. This is not limited to Advocates General trained 
in common law Member States. Striking examples can be found in decisions of German Advo-
cates General. T. Koopmans, Stare decisis in European Law, in EssAYS IN EuROPEAN LAW AND 
INTEGRATION 11, 21 (David O'Keefe & Henry G. Schermers eds., 1982). It is also interesting to 
note that German barristers "try occasionally to convince the court that it should overrule an 
earlier decision." ld. at 21. Perhaps the German legal professional is more comfortable using 
case law in this way because case law is significantly important in Germany, even though it is 
not considered an actual source of law. An accepted view is that judicial opinion in Germany is 
an important authority in the development and application of new legal questions. See FRECK-
MAN & WEGERICH, supra note 30, at 46, 91; YOUNGS, supra note I 09, at 53. 
179. ANTHONY ARNULL, THE EUROPEAN UNION AND ITS COURT OF JUSTICE 8 (1999). 
180. Several other elements from this model might also recommend it in global adjudica-
tions, over and above the civil law's predominance in national legal cultures around the world. 
Much of the preceding is in writing and the court has much more discretion to seek expert ad-
vice. Considerable resistance can be expected because, as discussed below, this process 
challenges a common lawyers' sense of fair procedure, even though many of these elements can 
be found in U.S. administrative adjudications. 
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In the civil law system, appellate courts review lower court judgments 
de novo. 181 Civil lawyers will expect global review-level tribunals to en-
gage in the same type of review. However, global judges may fall short of 
the civil law's juridical ideal. These tribunals will be more political, and 
their disagreement with lower tribunals will be suspect. 182 A pattern of 
disagreement will certainly affect the perception of any emerging global 
review authority. 
The civil law uses specialized tribunals. They serve the purpose of 
promoting the civil law's desire for expertise and the societal role of 
courts. However, the specialized tribunals also grew out of the need for 
court-like bodies separate from the "judiciary." Thus, certain categories of 
litigation, for example administrative disputes, proceeded through a spe-
cial court system. Judges in these courts were not selected according to 
the strict professional standards of the judiciary, permitting selection for 
subject-matter expertise and social policy perspective. More importantly, 
these courts might take on functions that appear legislative. 183 Much the 
same development may be seen in the U.S., but perhaps for different rea-
sons. Currently, many federal tribunals are not part of the judiciary as 
created by Article III of the U.S. Constitution. 184 
III. BLENDING TRANSATLANTIC LEGAL CULTURES 
INTO A GLOBAL JUDICIARY 
Having laid out some of the basic notions of the civil law model and 
suggested how those notions might play out in global perspective, the 
next step is to think about how the common law and civil law legal 
cultures may interact in the global arena. 185 Some observe a convergence 
of these two systems. 186 Surface similarities should not obscure the 
181. VRANKEN, supra note 79, at 59. The Supreme Court of Cassation, the highest French 
court, is not strictly a court of appeals. It only reexamines points of law, and it may not revise 
decisions, as would a court of appeals. CHRISTIAN DADOMO & SUSAN FARRAN, THE FRENCH 
LEGAL SYSTEM 189 (2d ed. 1996). Interestingly, Article III of the U.S. Constitution expressly 
grants the U.S. Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over facts as well as law. 
182. The same weakness is observed in U.S. administrative law when the review tribunal 
disagrees with the lower level. 
183. MERRYMAN, supra note 102, at 134. 
184. They are Article I courts and administrative agencies. See Judith Resnik, Rereading 
"The Federal Courts": Revising the Domain of Federal Courts Jurisprudence at the End of the 
Twentieth Century, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1021 (1994). 
185. National systems that mixed common Jaw and civil Jaw cover about 150 million 
people. PALMER, supra note 77, at 3. Reimann argued that mixed common Jaw and civil Jaw 
system can teach civilians about integration with modern legal cultures. Mathias Reimann, To-
wards a European Civil Code: Why Continental Jurists Should Consult Their Transatlantic 
Colleagues, 73 TuL. L. REv. 1337 (1999). 
186. DE CRuz, supra note 145, at 290 (summarizing convergence). 
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fundamental ideological difference in the way each system conceptualizes 
the law. Reimann recently observed: 
[T]here are important divergencies between continental civil law 
and (English, Irish, and to some extent Scottish) common law in 
the fabric of private law itself. Even if one were to accept that the 
substantive discrepancies between the civil and common law have 
been overrated and that the systems have been converging, there 
remain indisputable disparities regarding the respective concep-
tual tools and general structures. 187 
Because the differences are so deep seated, surface convergence is not 
likely to relieve the basic tension between the two legal cultures as they 
vie for place in the global arena. 
The different fundamental principles and instincts lead lawyers and 
scholars to approach legal questions quite differently. Lawyers and offi-
cials from the two regimes approach drafting and interpretation of the 
framework documents in quite distinct ways. When a civil lawyer contests 
against, or works with, a common lawyer, the two will have a fundamen-
tally different native sense of "law." Thus, it is useful to now tum to the 
risky prediction of how the two regimes will be accommodated in a 
global legal system. Again for emphasis, this framework anticipates the 
contribution of other legal systems but finds a civil law and common law 
base a very useful place to start. 
A. Approach to Established and Foundational Legislation 
The core distinction between civil law and common law is their ap-
proach to authoritative documents. Because of this difference, each will 
expect founding agreements, global legislation, and pronouncements from 
supranational governments to be drafted and interpreted with their own 
approach in mind. 188 Therefore, the merger will generate tension and per-
haps misunderstanding in both drafting and interpretative principles. 
The simplistic distinction that the civil law follows statutes whereas 
the common law leaves judges considerable freedom is belied by history. 
Statutory interpretation has always been crucial to common law legal 
reasoning. 189 Indeed, it seems that Justice Coke created a weak commit-
ment to statutory interpretation and the exultation of judicial optmon. 
That view never really dominated English legal thought. Indeed, 
187. Reimann, supra note 185, at 1342. 
188. Civil lawyers draft keeping interpretative principles in mind. VRANKEN, supra note 
79, at 38. 
189. J.W. TuBBS, THE COMMON LAW MIND: MEDIEVAL AND EARLY MODERN CONCEP-
TION 61-62 (2000). 
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Bonham's case, 190 which established the principle of judicial dominance, 
is remarkable in fact as an exception to the dominance of statutory lan-
guage, an exception that did not hold over time. 191 Even Coke recognized 
that courts must follow the statute and exercise discretion only when the 
language fails to answer a particular case. 192 This approach has not been 
completely lost in the modem common law practice. 193 Undeniably, how-
ever, U.S. jurisprudence has accepted a cavalier judicial approach to 
legislative language. 
In both systems, judges are bound in some degree by the language of 
authoritative documents, and must engage in interpretation. As discussed 
above, the civil law is dominated by scholars and academic lawyers, 
whereas the common law is dominated by practitioners turned judges. 
Thus, another area of tension is the relative weight of judicial 
interpretation versus that of jurists. Merryman, for example, claims that 
the common law is the law of judges and the civil law is the law of law 
professors.194 That is, judges who are the pinnacle of the law-development 
process dominates the common law, whereas the civil law exults jurists 
and scholarly development. Islamic law is also built on the work of 
scholars. 195 Another one billion or so members of the world community 
are likely to place special value on scholarly interpretation. 
Nonetheless, it is the nature of the foundational written law, the con-
cept of a "code," and the ideology derived from a system founded on a 
written base, that distinguishes the two legal cultures. 196 The nature of the 
190. Dr. Bonham's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 638 (K.B. 1610). 
191. In commenting on Coke's audacity in declaring an act of Parliament void, Wade and 
Forsyth state that, "No modem judge could repeat this exploit, for to hold an Act of Parliament 
void is to blaspheme against the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty." WADE, supra note 72, at 
467--68. 
192. SIR EDWARD COKE, THE FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTE OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND§ 
21 (Philadelphia, Robert H. Small1853) (1628). 
193. MERRYMAN, supra note 102, at 26--27. 
194. /d. at 59--60. 
195. "Islamic law represents an extreme case of a 'jurist law'; it was created and further 
developed by private specialists, a phenomenon well known to sociology of law .... " JosEPH 
SCHACHT, AN INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMIC LAW 209-10 (1964). Islamic law provides the unique 
phenomenon of legal science combined with scholarly handbooks having the force of law, not 
the state playing the part of a legislator (to the extent to which Islamic law was applied in prac-
tice). This "classical" view of Islamic law is challenged to the extent to which the formative 
scholars engaged in interpretation or creation. 
196. This is not to say that the civil code has not been without its proponents in common 
law countries. Jeremy Bentham and David Dudley Field, from the U.K. and the U.S. respec-
tively, were early proponents of civil law concepts. Jeremy Bentham's push for a 'complete 
body' of Jaw stretched across the Atlantic, going so far as to solicit then U.S. President James 
Madison's permission to codify U.S. common law. See THE COLLECTED WoRKS OF JEREMY 
BENTHAM: 'LEGISLATOR OF THE WORLD': WRITINGS ON CODIFICATION, LAW AND EDUCATION 
5 (Philip Schofield & Jonathan Harris eds., 1998) (letter from Jeremy Bentham to James Madi-
son). Early in U.S. history, the civil law vied with common law. 
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language itself is likely to be different. The code, as discussed above, is a 
framework, creating at once a stable platform and a guide to adaptation. 
Because experts draft the code, it constitutes an effort to rationalize the 
basic laws (thereby channeling statutory and administrative laws). The 
code concept requires faithfulness to language and a commitment to find 
the law in authoritative documents. 
It is then not so much the code itself but the legal philosophy, which 
the code instills in the civil law mind that separates the two legal cultures. 
Statutory language for modern common law, at least as manifest in the 
U.S., is organic, a living creature. The U.S. approach easily recognizes 
the need for judicial adaptation. It has not committed itself to a stable ap-
proach to statutory interpretation. Judicial authority in the civil system, as 
discussed above, is limited. In other words, the strong judicial role of the 
common law system permits "soft" statutory language, where the weak 
civil judiciary requires "hard" language. 197 
Civil law-like ideological constraints are evident in international tri-
bunals. A somewhat extreme example can be observed when an 
international tribunal observes a non liquet and does not resolve the 
claims in a case. A non liquet occurs when a judicial body decides not to 
decide a case because there is a "gap" in the law. 198 The tribunal, in such a 
case, is unwilling to go beyond textual language to decide disputes not 
foreseen by treaty and statutory creators. GATT and WTO examples of 
non liquets are the unadopted panel report in EEC Wheat Flour Export 
Subsidies and the Coconuts case. 199 This approach to international adjudi-
cation is also seen in ICJ jurisprudence. In South West Africa (Eth. v. S. 
Afr.; Liber. v. S. Afr.),200 the ICJ refused to decide a case because of the 
Throughout [the period between the Revolution to the Civil War], but especially in 
the middle decades, a determined effort was made by a succession of zealots to in-
troduce into the United States the institution and methods of the civil law, if not as a 
substitute for, at least as a supplement to, those of the common law .... This propa-
ganda campaign failed to achieve its objects and is now largely overlooked. 
The Attraction of the Civil Law in Post-Revolutionary America, in PETER STEIN, THE CHAR-
ACTER AND INFLUENCE OF ROMAN CIVIL LAW: HISTORICAL EsSAYS 411 (1988). David Dudely 
Field was Bentham's North American counterpart, working as the "pre-eminent figure in 
American law reform." See CHARLES M. COOK, THE AMERICAN CODIFICATION MOVEMENT: A 
STUDY OF ANTEBELLUM LEGAL REFORM 186 (1981). He drew up his "Field Code" to replace 
New York common law, covering almost every aspect of the law, including criminal law, civil 
law, government organization, and court procedure. See Andrew P. Morriss et al., Debating the 
Field Civil Code 105 Years Later, 61 MoNT. L. REv. 371,373 (2000). 
197. Mattei, supra note 128, at 17-18. 
198. See William J. Davey, Has the WTO Dispute Settlement System Exceeded Its Author-
ity?, 4 J. INT'L EcoN. L. 79, 96 (2001). 
199. /d. 
200. 1966 I.C.J. 6 (July 18). 
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lack of an "objective rule." It reasoned that any decision would force it to 
go beyond its judicial mandate.201 
In order to predict how the two interpretative tendencies will interact, 
one must begin by identifying the points of potential tension in the way 
each treats statutory language. As discussed above, civil law lawyers see 
interpretation as a scientific exercise.202 So the real working difference 
between the two approaches to interpretation is the more structured ap-
proach of the civil law legal culture. Civil law interpretation proceeds 
according to rules. Commentators aptly analogize the core concept to 
chess.203 Civil law judges move, but according to well established rules, 
whereas common law judges often see statutory language as providing a 
mere springboard from which they create the law for a specific case. 
Language in civil law interpretation provides a stable platform, a frame-
work, from which the civil law judge must work.204 This sense of stability 
may unsettle U.S. lawyers, and they may not readily understand the 
moves civil law insists on, especially since U.S. jurisprudence has be-
come imbued with realism and post-modemism.205 While judges in each 
system must apply clear language, a civil law judge actually takes their 
duty to find the meaning of the language seriously, to honestly engage in 
interpretation.206 That approach is often termed "grammatical," and is, in 
reality, quite different from "interpretation" engaged in by U.S. judges.207 
201. Patricia! Isela Hansen, Antitrust in the Global Market: Rethinking "Reasonable Ex-
pectations", 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 1601, 1638 n. 197 (1999). 
202. VRANKEN, supra note 79, at 63-64. 
203. MERRYMAN, supra note 102, at 48. LAWSON, supra note 120, at 66. In some sense, 
however, this may be a universal character of law itself, existing in the common law system as 
well. Likewise: 
There is a sense in which [Stanley] Fish's conception of law as a self-contained prac-
tice is unexceptional. Indeed, to the extent that Jaw is given structure by, and 
functions in accordance with, a particular combination of certain rules, norms, stan-
dards, and conventions, it seems clear that it is a unique and self-contained practice. 
In this sense, law is a self-contained practice just as is a game like chess or checkers. 
MICHEL ROSENFELD, JUST INTERPRETATIONS: LAW BETWEEN ETHICS AND POLITICS 42 (1998). 
204. DE CRUZ, supra note 145, at 270. 
205. 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ETHICS 1352 (Lawrence C. Becker & Charlotte B. Becker eds., 
2d ed. 2001). "[A]ll [post-modernists] agree that moral responsiveness is neither a product of 
deliberation or argument, or something that a theoretical justification would secure." Mattei, 
supra note 128, at 13. Mattei advocates a "hard" European code in this environment because the 
weak postmodern sense of the law works to the advantage of the economically and politically 
strong. 
206. See DE CRUZ, supra note 145, at 267-69. 
207. Lasser describes the difference in terms of two modes: grammatical and policy her-
meneutics. "Unlike the French judicial system, which offers two relatively segregated modes of 
discourse (the officiaVgrarnmatical and the unofficiaVhermeneutic), the American judicial sys-
tem tends to combine the grammatical and hermeneutic discourse in a single space-the judicial 
opinion." Lasser, supra note 147, at 702. He goes on to demonstrate in these terms how, in the 
U.S., judicial text displaces the primary text: 
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A U.S. jurist might characterize the difference in the two visions of 
judicial conduct as between formalism and realism. 208 A U.S. lawyer 
views the civil law approach as formalistic, even though such a charac-
terization fails to capture the subtleties of the civil law approach. De Cruz 
has observed, for example, that the French approach is formalistic, the 
U.S. approach is instrumental, and English law lies somewhere in be-
tween.209 In U.S. jurisprudence, realism with respect to what judges do 
has been converted into what they ought to do. Its philosophy sets the ju-
diciary free not just to interpret, but to "legislate," restrained only by the 
context of the individual dispute. U.S. interpretation contemplates judges 
balancing the interests embodied in the legislation rather than merely 
finding meaning in the language.210 It is not in its insistence on the binding 
force of language, but on the style of judicial development that civil law 
will contest with common law. 
As discussed previously in Section ITA, the scientific method sup-
porting the civil law approach parallels what in U.S. jurisprudence is 
termed "categorization."211 Categorization has been an important, and of-
ten dominant, strategy in the U.S.212 Yet, categorization is often criticized 
by modem U.S. commentators as insensitive and static. As discussed, 
both the civil law system and categorization are adaptive and creative, but 
their progressive principles require a special kind of manipulation. Cate-
gorization creates a structured creativity in the law so that logic and 
experience move the law according to certain established concepts. 
In modem U.S. jurisprudence, the categorization approach often gives 
way to balancing. "Balancing requires the explicit articulation and com-
parison of rights or structural provisions, modes of infringement, and 
government interests."213 One might argue that balancing is inherently 
The shift to purposive discourse and effect orientation represents a shift away from gram-
matical reading; it represents the deprioritizing of a certain "literalist" -or, in current legal terms, 
"formalist"-mode of reading in favor of an explicitly hermeneutic approach. This new approach 
seeks to generate the meaning of the controlling legal text by reading the language of the text in 
terms of something else: its purpose and practical effect. 
/d. at 703. 
208. See generally Barry Cushman, Formalism and Realism in Commerce Clause Juris-
prudence, 67 U. CHI. L. REv. 1089-90 (2000). For the impact in civil law, see MERRYMAN, 
supra note I 02, at 45-46. 
209. DE CRUZ, supra note 145, at 289. 
210. See Cass Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 
405, 456 (1989). 
211. See MERRYMAN, supra note 102, at 63, 66--fJ7. 
212. See Kennedy, supra note 158, at 3-4. Kennedy's "classical legal thought" seems the 
equivalent of what is termed here "categorization": "Classical legal thought was an ordering, in 
the sense that it took a very large number of actual processes and events and asserted that they 
could be reduced to a much smaller number with a definite pattern." /d. at 8. 
213. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. 
REV. 22, 61 (1992). 
Fall2003] Envisioning a Global Legal Culture 45 
consonant with common law in much the same way categorization is with 
the civil law.214 Balancing presents some methodological opportunities 
that suggest it to the common law mind. Balancing offers an opportunity 
for a judge to tailor the law to a particular litigation; it seems less abstract 
and more sensitive to individual circumstances. On the other hand, bal-
ancing has been criticized as allowing judicial law making based on 
personal prejudice and preference.215 A corrupt resort to the balancing 
strategy can be a tool for deceit and special interest promotion, just as 
honest employment illuminates sensitive comparisons of accepted val-
ues.216 The freedom won through balancing, at its best, assists the judge in 
doing individual justice, but this freedom also necessarily creates the op-
portunity for abuse. Sullivan, for example, summarizes the view that 
categorization reduces the potential of the decision maker to "factor[] the 
parties' particular attractive or unattractive qualities into the decision 
making calculus."217 
The adaptability of balancing to judge-dominated policymaking is 
another aspect of balancing that fits the modern U.S. instinct for judicial 
activism but may offend civil law instincts. Balancing permits judges to 
justify policymaking based upon on the circumstances of the individual 
case before them. Yet, the very focus on an individual case recommends 
against balancing for broad policymaking. Through balancing, judicial 
policymaking may be opportunistic in disregarding and modifying past 
approaches, but they are also limited in their policy choices by the context 
of the case presented. On the other hand, as discussed in Part II, civil 
judges may not allow individual disputes to cloud their vision of societal 
values. In short, civil lawyers may find that balancing fails policymaking 
because of its tendency to narrow perspective as well as its weakness in 
incorporating past learning. 
Balancing, however, is not a necessary aspect of the common law ap-
proach to interpretation. Not only is judicial resort to balancing a fairly 
new development in U.S. judicial justification, but U.S. courts still engage 
in categorization. Balancing was not prevalent in Supreme Court opinions 
214. Aleinikoff, supra note 157, 961 (suggesting that balancing approaches mimic com-
mon law approaches, thereby permitting flexibility and providing a strategy for legal 
development). 
215. /d. at 962. 
216. Steve Sheppard, The State Interest in the Good Citizen: Constitutional Balance Be-
tween the Citizen and the Peifectionist State, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 969,970 (1994) (asserting that a 
balancing method can be employed for honest or dishonest purposes, depending on the intent of 
the person employing the method). 
217. Sullivan, supra note 213, at 62. 
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until the second quarter of 20th century.218 Although the modem U.S. legal 
mind seems most comfortable with justifications based on balancing, 
judges today are just as apt to rely on categorization.219 As Sheppard ob-
served: "The Court balances, and the Court categorizes. Not only are both 
methods compatible, but both are now sufficiently entrenched as judicial 
tools of adjudication that the Court is unlikely to rewrite so much prece-
dent merely because of a mode of interpretation."220 Today, however, 
categorization is seen as doctrinaire and stifling, i.e. inherently conserva-
tive, and hence balancing has come to be seen as a progressive approach 
to law.221 
A balancing approach, used in a global context with diverse cultures, 
would be particularly difficult to implement. It would raise the specter of 
all sorts of cultural, racial, regional and ethnic conflicts. Balancing nec-
essarily sets values, often fundamental, against each other. Balancing will 
thus generate tension independent of the level of freedom granted to 
judges. Even in the context of U.S. culture, some doubt that values are 
sufficiently commensurate to validate the use of a balancing approach in 
many cases.222 For instance, it may be deceptive to attempt to denominate 
218. Aleinikoff, supra note 157, at 949 ("The great constitutional opinions of the nine-
teenth and early twentieth century did not employ balancing as a method of constitutional 
argument or justification."). 
219. For example, Kathleen Sullivan observed that Supreme Court Justices divided over 
the choice between "rules" (a categorization-based approach) and "standards" (a balanc-
ing-based approach) in the 1991 term. Sullivan, supra note 213, at 69. 
220. Sheppard, supra note 216, at 975. 
221. But see id. at 973 ("[T]he discussion about whether the balancing or the categorical 
approach is better ... reflects a false dichotomy."). Stephen E. Gottlieb, The Paradox of Bal-
ancing Significant Interests, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 825, 838 (1994) ("The dispute over 
categorization and balancing is miscast for three reasons. First, the methods are not often deter-
minative. Second, the methods can often be translated into one another. Third, ... the dispute is 
miscast because the decision between balancing and not balancing is illusory."). In fact, balanc-
ing often, especially in application, evolves into categories. Categories are in some sense 
established, justified and adjusted through "global balancing." Aleinikoff, supra note 157, at 
978. "Categoric balancing" may in reality be seen as either balancing or categorization; the 
balance once struck is applied as categories. Indeed, exposition on, or a derivation from, princi-
ples may look to balancing as well as classification. Jeremy Waldron, Fake Incommensurability: 
A Response to Professor Schauer, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 813, 819-820 (1994 ). Even ad hoc balanc-
ing would be too burdensome to decision makers without certain standards or limits on the 
range of issues for which balancing actually is to be employed. Gottlieb, supra, at 855-56. Sul-
livan concluded: "These distinctions between rules and standards, categorization and balancing, 
mark a continuum, not a divide." Sullivan, supra note 213, at 61. 
222. E.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in ww, 92 MICH. L. REV. 
779, 786 (1994). The incommensurability debate is informative, but is generally beyond the 
scope of this Article. See Symposium: ww and Incommensurability, 146 U. PA. L. REv. 1169 
(1998). 
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rights in a single currency and weigh their relative worth.223 The of-
ten-subconscious realization that the interests involved are not actually 
comparable leads courts to camouflage the "intuitive" nature of their de-
cisions with balancing justifications. 224 Even if Schauer is correct in 
arguing that it may be preferable to base rights decisions on imperfect 
commensurability in values accepted in U.S. culture, the complexity of 
commensurability in the global community still dictates against judicial 
balancing as an interpretative device.225 
In sum, both ideologies accommodate growth and adjustment in the 
treatment of authoritative documents. General principles of international 
law might support both. Whereas the Vienna Convention requires a strong 
commitment first to text, and then its history, it also recognizes modifica-
tion by "subsequent practice.226 Yet, the more structured civil law system's 
approach to adaptation and creativity may be more defensible in the 
global arena. 
B. Disagreement Over Fundamental Principles 
Fundamental principles become important to interpretation under any 
legal regime. While civil law and common law legal cultures have some 
basic disagreements regarding interpretation, they share many fundamen-
tal principles. These philosophies and principles are not shared throughout 
the global community. 227 Disagreements at fundamental levels are very 
difficult to negotiate and compromise.228 Thus, in the global arena, legal 
223. Aleinikoff, supra note 157, at 973 ("The problem for constitutional balancing is the 
derivation of the scale needed to translate the value of interests into a common currency for 
comparison."). 
224. /d. at 975-76 (identifying several techniques courts "adopt to strike the unstrikeable 
balance."). Aleinikoff finds that the U.S. Supreme Court resort to a vocabulary that creates the 
appearance of comparison, depreciation of one of the interests, and statements of the problem in 
balancing terms, but in actually they decide the case on very different grounds. 
225. Frederick Schauer, Commensurability and Its Constitutional Consequences, 45 
HASTINGS L.J. 785, 806 (1994) (arguing that decision making that holds rights commensurable 
to the greatest extent possible may still be valuable). Schauer propounds a kind of second-best 
argument whereby shutting down the analysis in the absence of perfect commensurability is 
inferior to making a decision based on imperfect commensurability. /d. at 799. 
226. Vienna Convention: Treaties, supra note 130, at art. 31 (3)(b ), 1155 U .N.T.S. 331, 340 
("any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the 
parties regarding its interpretation"). 
227. For example, some cultures might choose societal values over the dominance of the 
individual. JOHN OWEN HALEY, AUTHORITY WITHOUT POWER: LAW AND THE JAPANESE 
PARADOX 77 (1991) (noting criticism of the adoption of the civil law system because "intrinsic 
to Western private law was a radical individualism that could only erode Japan's historical ori-
entations and understandings involving the family, authority, and the state."). See also VICKI C. 
JACKSON & MARK TuSHNET, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 248 (1999) ("The Chinese 
constitutions assume that the purpose of rights is to enable citizens to support the broader inter-
ests of the community."). 
228. See generally ROGER FISHER ET AL., GETTING TO YES (2d ed. 1991). 
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notions derived from fundamental principles may be the focus of the most 
difficult legal conflicts to resolve. 
The underlying aspect of a natural law foundation inherent in the civil 
code, as noted in the prior section, might be difficult for other cultures to 
accept. Even U.S. lawyers, who might share some of the civil law's fun-
damental principles, might not accept their natural law source. Pound 
observed that both the civil and common law moved away from natural 
law in the 19th century. 229 The two cultures diverge as to the implications 
of that movement. U.S. legal philosophy has little regard, even disdain, 
for natural law, whereas, as discussed in the prior part, natural law is still 
respected in the civil law world at least as one source of codification. Ar-
guments with a natural law feel in the global context might have more 
currency for civilians than common lawyers.230 
Similarly, the evolution of the civil law relied on secular natural law. 
Many of the world's legal systems, which include a large portion of the 
world's population, have strong, if not dominant, religious aspects. 231 
Legal systems that are consciously religious, such as those with Islamic 
and Hindu elements, will resist even the secularization goal. More to the 
point, they can be expected to inject religious elements into the global 
legal dialogue. 
On the other hand, the sources of fundamental principles in transat-
lantic legal culture are in fact religious. The religious base of transatlantic 
law will be a source of tension in the global arena. Canon, or Catholic, 
law is one of the three jus commune, or sources of civillaw.232 Although 
the code attempted to secularize the law, its religious genesis cannot be 
ignored. A look at any of its founding documents reveals that basic U.S. 
principles also have a religious base. Like the civil law, the U.S. legal 
culture has attempted to secularize these principles, but their origins can-
not be denied. Those from non-Christian legal cultures will find the 
229. RoSCOE POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE CoMMON LAW 145-47 (1963) ("Although 
eighteenth-century natural law had led to codification and had become an absolute system it 
was not equal to the philosophical problem of nineteenth-century law."). 
230. Interestingly, the code concept is based on an acceptance of natural law. See 
ZwEIGERT & K6TZ, supra note 83. U.S. legal thought is not just hostile to natural law, but de-
nies the existence of any essential principles. Nonetheless, much of the balancing analysis 
engaged in by U.S. courts has the feel of natural law analysis. 
231. See Marc Galanter & Jayanth Krishnan, Personal Law and Human Rights in India 
and Israel, 34 IsRAEL L. REv. 101, 103 (2000) (noting the "distinctive religious legacy" of these 
countries' legal systems). Hindu law covers about 450 million people. ZwEIGERT & K6TZ, 
supra note 83, at 313. Islamic law covers in some way all 1.2 billion Muslims. ENCYCLOPEDIA 
BRITANNICA 2002 BOOK OF THE YEAR 302. Approximately one billion Muslims Jive in either 
Islamic legal systems or a system in which Islamic law is mixed with other forms, usually either 
civil law or common law. See generally CIA WORLD FACTBOOK (Jan. 1, 2003), available at 
http://www.odci.gov/cialpublications/factbooklindex.html. 
232. MERRYMAN, supra note I 02, at I 0--11. 
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inherent validity of these principles debatable. Indeed, the religious back-
ground of the principles by itself will make them suspect. Many will 
prefer their own religiously-based legal principles. Again, these types of 
disagreements are particularly difficult to work out. 
International agreements, rather than judicial decisions, will mediate 
many of these fundamental conflicts. To the extent that agreements estab-
lishing supranational governments are constitutional in nature, they will 
address some fundamental principles.233 Their constitutional stature will 
take issues off the table and hence dictate fundamental values to future 
generations.234 Thus, tension will grow between the vision of the founding 
generation and that of any current generation. Moreover, many 
non-transatlantic participants will not be able to affect the basic agree-
ments. Those unable to participate will resent particularly the embedding 
of fundamental principles in basic documents of supranational govern-
ments. 
On the other hand, international participants finesse rather than con-
front many of these issues in the basic agreements. The very emotional 
explosiveness of fundamental principles, especially those with religious 
bases, will convince negotiators to avoid those controversies, leaving 
many of them to be resolved in the adjudicative context. Many have ob-
served that the concession of authority by political institutions often 
results from the desire to avoid difficult decisions.235 Global tribunals will 
need to defuse tensions by adjusting foundational language and resolving 
residual fundamental issues. 
In short, global tribunals will have to accommodate a wide range of 
foundational principles. The comparative law's identification of "fami-
lies" of legal cultures may help rationalize these fundamental conflicts.236 
Zweigert and Kotz, in their leading comparative work, recommend that 
233. Undeniably, the basic supranational agreements have constitutional aspects. See 
McGinnis & Movsesian, supra note II. 
234. Constitutions freeze fundamental values. See MERRYMAN, supra note 102, at 24 
(explaining how the rigidity of constitutions "impair[s] the legislature's monopoly on lawmak-
ing."). A constitution might be seen as resolving in an especially stable way certain fundamental 
societal issues, thereby permitting society to operate without (constantly) revisiting those issues. 
Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism and Secession, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 633, 639 (1991) ("Con-
stitutional provisions may be facilitative in quite another sense: a decision to take certain issues 
off the ordinary political agenda may be indispensable to the political process"). In a sense, a 
code does just the opposite; it identifies issues that must be resolved in individual context. 
235. E.g., JAMES 0. fREEDMAN, CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY: THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 
AND AMERICAN GovERNMENT 93-94 (1978); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Role of Constitutional 
and Political Theory in Administrative Law, 64 TEx. L. REv. 469, 499-500 ( 1985). 
236. DAVID & BRIERLEY, supra note 110, at 17 ("In law, as in other sciences, one can 
detect the existence of a limited number of types or categories within which this diversity can be 
organized .... [T]he comparatist can classify laws by reducing them to a limited number of 
families."). 
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the world's legal cultures can be distinguished according to their "styles," 
much like different categories of literature or fine arts.237 They use five 
factors to classify legal families: 
(1) its historical background and development, (2) its predomi-
nant and characteristic mode of thought in legal matters, 
(3) especially distinctive institutions, (4) the kind of legal sources 
it acknowledges and the way it handles them, and (5) its ideol-
ogy. 238 
Based on these factors, they identify six groupings (Romanistic, 
Germanic, Anglo-American, Nordic, Far East, and Religious) and pro-
vide careful analysis of their distinctive features. However, although 
academically predominant, the strong transatlantic bias in these classifi-
cations raises questions that may require contributions from other 
societies as the global legal culture evolves. Here, it is sufficient to view 
this approach and the sophisticated work done by these and other com-
parative scholars to find commonality among categories of legal cultures 
as a useful device for melding the world's legal cultures, even in terms of 
fundamental principles. 
C. Use of Case Law 
The function and status of case law is the generally understood dif-
ference between the two systems of civil and common law. However, as 
with the popular view regarding differences in statutory interpretation, the 
disparity here is subtle. First, as is generally recognized, the approach to 
judicial decisions does differ, both in kind and degree, but civil law opin-
ions are not without effect. Nonetheless, a sense of convergence in 
attention to the work of other judges does not affect the ideological dis-
tinction between judicial authority and judicial law making within the two 
systems. Second, the civil law doctrine has its own commitment to con-
sistency, but that doctrine aims at overall consistency, not just consistency 
in dispute resolution. Third, the reputed distinction between the common 
law's inductive approach and the civil law's deductive approach masks the 
real difference in the logic applied when deciding cases, and hence the 
very impact of case law. Fourth, it is generally perceived that common 
law judges have more authority over legal questions than civil law judges, 
but they do not have more authority over their own cases. That is, the 
237. ZwEIGERT & KoTz, supra note 83, at 67-68. 
238. /d. at 68. But categorization requires sophisticated analysis: "These are the stylistic 
factors which enable us to identify the families of legal systems and to attribute individual sys-
tems to them, but the weight to be given to each of these factors varies according to the 
circumstances." /d. at 72. 
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concept of judicial authority is different, but in deciding cases the differ-
ence may not be the degree of judicial power but the nature of judicial 
power. These confusions must be worked out in order to envision the 
melding of the two systems in a global regime. 
First, while there is a difference in the weight each system gives to 
prior decisions, that difference only partially explains the difference in 
impact prior decisions make in judging. Civil law judges do in fact take 
prior decisions into account. Indeed, Merryman observed: "A lawyer pre-
paring a case searches for cases in point, uses them in his argument; and 
the judge deciding a case often refers to prior cases."239 Only a fool would 
refuse to seek guidance in the work of other judges confronted with simi-
lar problems. The civil law system is unlikely to produce any more fools 
than the common law system. 
Nonetheless, because the instincts of the two systems are fundamen-
tally different, the convergence, some observe, confuses form with 
substance. The difference is not refusal to note precedent, but the ideology 
of stare decisis. 240 That is, the common law holds onto the idea that prior 
decisions are binding on subsequent judges, so that judges and everyone 
else must consider case decisions to be "law." True, the relevant law is not 
fundamentally derived from judicial decisions in common law systems, 
and hence common law judges must interpret and apply statutory lan-
guage. True, common law judges seem less inclined to observe stare 
decisis than common law doctrine would dictate. At the same time, civil 
law judges are paying more attention to their colleagues' decisions than 
one might assume. Lawyers in civil law systems certainly refer to prior 
decisions. As translated into E.U. law, civil law judges are assuming more 
authority, and are more actively making law. Still, in the end, judging in-
dividual cases is fundamentally different. There remains a great gap in 
respective judicial goals. And there remains a fundamental difference in 
the impact those decisions have.241 
239. MERRYMAN, supra note 102, at 47. 
240. See, e.g., LAWSON, supra note 120, at 83. Furthermore: 
/d. 
[W]hether credence can be accorded to the popular view that the Civil Law is differ-
entiated from the Common Law by its refusal to accept the principle of stare decisis 
.... [p]ersonally I doubt whether any general answer can be given to it. Of course in 
the strict sense that a judge is absolutely bound by a previous decision which he 
knows to be radically wrong in logic, justice, and common sense, no Civil Law judge 
adheres to the principle. 
241. Francisco Ramos, Judicial Cooperation in the European Courts: Testing Three Mod-
els of Judicial Behavior, 2 GLOBAL JURIST FRONTIERS 1, 16 (2002) (arguing that while 
European courts use other courts' decision, "[t]he fact that there is no obligation of stare decisis 
makes courts less aware and less use to the usage of decisions of other courts. This will certainly 
result in divergence among and within countries."). 
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In global decisions, global judges will pay attention to the opinions of 
their colleagues, and hence will tend towards a system of precedent. Re-
nowned expert Shabtai Rosenne notes that the ICJ Charter, 
contains an apparent limitation on the Court's freedom to employ 
judicial decisions as a subsidiary means for the determination of 
the rules of law. This, however, is not the interpretation placed 
upon that provision by the Court, which habitually refers to its 
own decisions and those of the [predecessor] Permanent Court. 242 
Therefore, global legal culture may already be accustomed to giving 
case law precedential force. But global tribunals may use precedent more 
as the civil law does, because its limits on judicial law development may 
be more appropriate to the international arena. Governments, including 
common law jurisdictions, will want more control, especially "statutory" 
control, over the global judiciary than afforded by the common law ap-
proach. The authority of case law in the global arena will be more a 
matter of acquiescence than imposition of common law stare decisis. 
To some extent, the supranational tribunals themselves hold the key to 
asserting their authority to develop law. While the code concept itself 
grew from, and has largely been adopted around the world because of, a 
distrust of courts, a growing respect for courts is now present. The U.S. 
experience has demonstrated the advantages of strong courts. The status 
of courts has changed in European civil law countries. More to the point, 
their civil law progeny, the ECJ, has been a very activist court, and has 
enjoyed the trust of E.U. citizens.243 Therefore, the global judiciary can 
overcome any inherent distrust of courts. To the extent they do, they, like 
the ECJ, will find their opinions having considerable, even approaching 
binding, force outside the adoption of a formal sense of stare decisis. 244 
The increasing weight given precedent by the ECJ demonstrates 
natural evolution in supranational law, even one based on civil law princi-
ples. The E.U. treaty clearly envisions courts, both E.U. and national 
courts, being prominent players in European affairs and not being subju-
gated to other E.U. or national institutions.245 Ramos found that the very 
242. RosENNE, supra note 19, at 1609. 
243. "Legal scholars have explained national government acceptance of the ECJ's su-
premacy declaration based on the compelling nature of legal reasoning, the authority of the legal 
process itself, and the respect and reverence accorded to the decisions of high judicial bodies." 
Alter, supra note 49, at 184 (noting also that others see it as a mere power grab). 
244. The ECJ's ability to definitively interpret E.U. law gives its opinions force, creating a 
culture of attention to case law even in civil law countries. Tridimas & Tridimas, supra note 13, 
at 6 ("[A]lthough the judgment does not form binding precedent in the way understood in the 
Anglo-Saxon legal systems, it has normative value in that it settles a point of interpretation or 
validity"). 
245. See generally VRANKEN, supra note 79, at 194-209. 
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act of "law finding" in the E.U.'s quasi-civil law system naturally creates 
weight for precedent.246 In fact, judge-made law is apparent in the ECJ.247 
In a preliminary ruling requested by a German court, for example, the 
ECJ noted that because the protection of legitimate expectations exists as 
a general principle of law in the E.U.'s member states, then it must be 
protected as a principle of Community law.248 However, in a later case, the 
ECJ applied the principle of legitimate expectations in a way, which 
seemed contrary to the laws of most, if not all, member-states.249 Ake-
hurst described what occurred in this case: "Each successive judgment of 
the Court slightly alters the content of the principle, so that the Court can 
end up by applying a principle in a manner which is contrary to the laws 
of all the member states."250 In short, its growing legitimacy and record of 
competence allows the ECJ to apply its own law with some force. 
The use of case law in the global arena is complicated by the absence 
of a structured global judicial system. Precedent has both horizontal and 
vertical effects.251 The horizontal effect of precedent defines how strongly 
a court feels bound by its own prior decisions. No matter which legal ide-
ology is dominant, courts tend to use their own prior decisions to inform 
the case at hand. In the global arena, however, the vertical impact is am-
biguous and ad hoc. Common lawyers are accustomed to great weight 
being given higher court precedent in lower courts.252 In contrast, as de-
scribed in Section II.C, civil law incorporates control over lower courts, 
but that control, in specific cases, is not nearly as strong as that in com-
mon law systems. In addition, the hierarchy of global judicial systems is 
not clearly established. In short, the lack of vertical authority in the global 
legal regime will continue to be most frustrating to common lawyers, 
certainly more so than to civilians. The tangle of both trade and rights 
supranational adjudicative structures will prevent a cure to this frustration, 
246. Ramos, supra note 241, at 12. "[A]djudicating in the European context has become 
more like a team enterprise." Id at 18. 
247. Michael Akehurst, The Application of General Principles of Law by the Court of 
Justice of the European Communities, 52 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 29, 39-40 (1981). 
248. Westzucher GmbH v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle fiir Zucher, 1973 E.C.R. 723, 739. 
249. Commission v. Council, 1973 E.C.R. 575, 584, 592-95. The court here applied le-
gitimate expectations in a general way, but the laws of the member states allowed the principle 
to be applicable only to individual decisions. 
250. Akehurst, supra note 247, at 40. Akehurst went on to state, "what the Court is really 
doing is creating law ... there is no reason to believe that the law created by the Court of Justice 
of the European Communities will be any less satisfactory than the English common law ... " 
(emphasis in original). 
251. PALMER, supra note 77, at 51-53. 
252. The strength of hierarchical precedent in practice is somewhat ambiguous. Evan H. 
Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Precedent?, 46 STAN. L. REv. 817 
(1994) (explaining how lower U.S. courts find ways around high court precedent). 
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until a firm judicial hierarchy is agreed upon for whatever theoretical 
weight should be assigned to precedent. 
A second subtlety in distinguishing the use of case law in the two 
systems derives from the civil law's own doctrines compelling consis-
tency, the overarching concept of "legal certainty".253 Both philosophies 
attempt to provide certainty to those covered by the law. The civil law 
system requires its judges to be faithful to statutory schemes, and the 
common law system requires commitment to prior, like decisions. Civil 
law judges must assure certainty within the whole society and not just 
consistency in dispute resolution. They decide individual cases in the 
context of a broad fabric of the law.254 Legal certainty requires the civil 
law judge to be sensitive to societal factors. 255 In contrast, the common 
law judge is charged with applying the "law" in order to render individual 
fairness, but is also committed to treating like cases alike. 
For this reason, civil law judges are more constrained than common 
law judges by specific statutory language. Nonetheless, U.S. jurispru-
dence also struggles with the overall confusion created by judicial law 
making. Justice Scalia of the United States Supreme Court has been a 
strong advocate for judicial faithfulness to language. For example, in his 
concurring opinion in Conroy v. Aniskoff,256 he criticized the Court for not 
adhering to the literal language of the statute. He argued that 
free-wheeling interpretation "undermines the clarity of law." 257 Many 
common law jurists over the years have argued that the law should be 
predictable. Treating like cases alike can do this, but perhaps not on as 
broad a scale as the civil law doctrine of legal certainty. Tension between 
the two legal ideologies in the global arena then may be better character-
ized as disagreement over the doctrine employed to ensure predictability 
in the law. 
253. "The most commonly invoked rational judgment criterion is a specific form of con-
sistency-the maintenance of a stable rule over time. This principle, captured in the doctrine of 
stare decisis, secures structural values such as predictability, stability, efficiency, and judicial 
legitimacy." Evan H. Caminker, Sincere and Strategic Voting Norms on Multimember Courts, 97 
MICH. L. REv. 2297, 2306 (1999) (citing Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REv. 571, 
595-602 (I 987)). 
254. See VRANKEN, supra note 79, at 43; see also LAWSON, supra note 120, at 80-81. 
255. The doctrine of legal certainty itself has its own Jaw-making capacity. For example, 
the ECJ in Case 69/89, Nakajima All Precision Co. v. Council, 1991 ECR I-02069, constructed 
the estoppel rule, which has no equivalent in Europe, out of the legal certainty and legitimate 
expectations principles. In doing so, "[t]he Court ... promote[ d) an adequate standard of civil 
rights' protection and procedural guarantees in Community law." Jiirgen Schwarze, Judicial 
Review in EC Law-Some Reflections on the Origins and the Actual Legal Situation, 51 INT'L & 
COMPAR. L.Q. 17,21 (2002). 
256. Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 518-19 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in judg-
ment). 
257. /d. 
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A third subtlety is that a difference in the logic used to decide cases 
has been expressed too formally. Civil law reasoning is said to be "deduc-
tive" (conclusions following from broad premises), whereas common 
lawyers are said to engage in "inductive" reasoning (reasoning from par-
ticular to general, or from a part to the whole). According to a Canadian 
Supreme Court judge conversant with both systems, there is: 
[A] difference in intellectual approach, in the quest and ordering 
of knowledge. Each approach reflects one of the modes of func-
tioning of the human intellect, that is, on the one hand, the 
empirical mode based on specific instances from which one may 
eventually draw rules and even identify principles and, on the 
other, the theoretical approach based on established principles 
from which concrete consequences and applications are drawn.258 
This traditional distinction may not, however, express the true differ-
ence. As Lawson observed: 
I have some doubt [that civil law reasoning is deductive whereas 
common law reasoning is inductive] .... In both cases the gen-
eral principle has to be found, in typical Common Law reasoning 
by grouping together a number of decisions and constructing 
equations explaining them, in the Civil Law by grouping together 
a number of texts .... A more important difference is probably to 
be found in the fact that whereas the materials from which the 
common lawyer has to find his general principles are constantly 
added to, and their general shape and balance altered by new de-
cisions ... [the civilian's] ultimate mass of materials remains 
h d 259 unc ange . 
Actually, there probably is some sense in which civil law instinctively 
reasons from larger principles, as judges and lawyers must start with the 
code framework, and the common law instinctively begins with specific 
decisions that must be put together in order to divine the large principles. 
That is what common law lawyers learn to do starting from law school. 
But this difference in "logic" is probably the result of the sources and 
stability of sources, rather than a conscious commitment to a particular 
logical methodology. 
A fourth subtlety must be recognized based on the difference between 
the authority of judicial opinions and the authority of judges. The theo-
retical power to make law is not the same as the power to decide the law 
258. VRANKEN, supra note 79, at 215-16, quoting Charles D. Gonthier, Some Comments 
on the Common Law and the Civil Law in Canada: Influences, Parallel Developments and · 
Borrowings, 21 CAN. Bus. L.J. 323 (1993). 
259. LAWSON, supra note 120, at 65. 
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in an individual case. In a particular case, civil law judges have more dis-
cretion than common law judges because they may decide how much 
weight to give the opinions of other judges.260 Theoretically, common law 
judges are bound by like cases whether they agree or not. 
So, because civil law judges have more discretion about the weight 
they give to prior decisions, in a sense they have more authority to think 
about their cases in broader terms than common law judges. Common law 
judges concentrate on applying the law to the individual dispute. Thereby, 
as cases are decided individually, the law evolves interstitially. Civil law 
judges are expected to decide their cases as part of a broader fabric. They 
are more interested in finding the right decision, assuring aggregate fair-
ness, than in assuring fairness in the individual case before them. Thus, 
the freedom from binding precedent is the freedom to assure that the case 
at hand conforms to the scheme of authoritative documents and the "law" 
in general, rather than to agree with colleague's judgments of equally 
narrow scope. 
In sum, added together, these subtle differences in legal philosophy 
will affect the use of case law in the global arena. U.S. jurists will argue 
for strong, even binding, effect for precedent. 261 Civil law jurists will not 
resist the use of prior cases in making arguments and decisions, but they 
will expect global judges to exercise the freedom to find the law in indi-
vidual cases consistent with their system. Global law will no doubt evolve 
through case law, but it is doubtful that case law will ever attain stare de-
cisis effect. 
D. Nature of the Judicial Decision Makers 
Much of the division between the civil law and common law results 
from different perceptions of the courts, and the relationship between 
courts and the "democratic" institutions of government. The diverse his-
torical experience with courts will affect how the systems are adapted in 
the global arena. Simply put, the common law grew out of distrust of 
majorities in democratic government, and the civil law reflects a distrust 
260. Mitchel de S.-0.-I'E Lasser, Judicial (Se/f-)Portraits: Judicial Discourse in the 
French Legal System, 104 YALE L.J. 1325, 1332 (1995) ("He is left entirely to his own de-
vises."). 
261. Bhala advocates the use of stare decisis in supranational tribunals. Raj Bhala, The 
Power of the Past: Towards De Jure Stare Decisis in WTO Adjudication, 33 GEO. WASH. INT'L 
L. REV. 873 (2001); see also Raj Bhala, The Myth About Stare Decisis and International Trade 
Law, 14 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 845 (1999); Raj Bhala, The Precedent Setters: De Facto Stare 
Decisis in WTO Adjudication (Part Two of a Trilogy), 9 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & PoL'Y I (1999). 
Bhala proposed an amendment to GAIT adopting stare decisis as the rule in WTO adjudica-
tions. !d. at 878. 
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of elitist courts.262 Although not universal, civil law jurisprudence grew 
out of experience that suggests that courts can do at least as much damage 
as any other institution of government. 
Such experiences are rare in U.S. history. The courts have more often 
been the vehicle of progress and protection of individual rights. In the 
early English experience of the common law, judges were allies of par-
liament in the struggle against royal (executive) authority. In the U.S., 
judicial independence from majoritarianism begins with Article III of the 
Constitution, and carries forward in essential concepts evolved over some 
200 years.263 The U.S. experience may justify a special commitment to the 
courts as the "least dangerous" branch, as the contrary experience in civil 
law nations justified distrust of courts.264 
Many emerging democracies come from a revolutionary experience 
similar to France. This experience provides much of the real world impe-
tus behind the choice of the civil law system. 265 Constraining judicial 
abuse runs through civil law judicial thinking. This reality resonates 
around the world because emerging democracies also have reason to dis-
trust their judiciaries. Indeed, revolutionary Communist constitutions 
subjugate the judiciary to the legislature. Hence, the former Communist 
countries, influenced by their previous regimes, are acutely aware of the 
potential for judicial abuse. 266 
Because the ideologies of the civil and common law emerged from 
conflicting realities, it may be hard to reconcile the two visions of the 
262. VRANKEN, supra note 79, at 63. Perhaps it is significant that Montesquieu, the god-
father of U.S. separation of powers theory, served as president of a parlement at a time when 
those courts were fighting to retain their traditional powers and privileges. SIMON ScHAMA, 
CiTIZENS: A CHRONICLE OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 107 (1989). Indeed, one contemporary 
commentator admonished: "0 Montesquieu, you are a Magistrate, a Gentleman, a rich man; you 
found it congenial ... to demonstrate the advantages of a government in which you occupied an 
advantageous place." /d. at 121. 
263. Actually, long tradition, rather than the U.S. Constitution, insulates courts from the 
democratic institutions, because it is generally conceded that Art. III, if read literally, provides 
for significant legislative control of the judiciary. 
264. Brickel's famous and perhaps elitist characterization incorporates the notion that 
courts are also dangerous but somewhat more trustworthy than the democratic institutions. 
ALEXANDER M. BRICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962). 
265. VRANKEN, supra note 79, at 63, see also supra footnote 262, and accompanying text. 
266. For example, the Chinese Constitution Article 128 provides that, "The Supreme Peo-
ple's Court is responsible to the National People's Congress and its Standing Committee." 
XIANFA art. 128 (1982). Article 67 states: 
The Standing Committee of the National People's Congress exercises the following func-
tions and powers: 
(I) to interpret the Constitution and supervise its enforcement; 
( 4) to interpret statutes ... 
/d. at art. 67. 
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courts. Even in Continental Europe, however, courts are increasingly 
called upon to vindicate individual rights and societal values. The ECJ, 
the E.U. court created and accepted by civil law E.U. members, has not 
been put under strong restraints. 267 The E.U. treaties themselves authorize 
the Court to review and overturn legislation as well as discipline member 
governments. The ECJ has found its power similar to that of the U.S. ju-
diciary: its power to mediate between the executive and legislative 
branches, and between the federal government and the states, is a source 
of much of its power. Its very un-civil law activism has resulted from this 
authority. 
For whatever reason, not only is the ECJ a much more activist court, 
more closely aligned with U.S. courts, but it has made other European 
courts much more aggressive. Thus, we might predict that the attitude of 
the U.S. courts over the last few generations, and that of the ECJ and its 
effect on member's courts, have combined to create an emerging global 
judicial attitude in which courts do not shrink from challenging legislative 
and executive action either by their own supranational governments or by 
member state governments. 268 This attitude contrasts with the traditional 
civil law attitude, but has been increasingly accepted in civil law legal 
cultures. 
One can expect both the WTO and the ICJ to be reasonably aggres-
sive in carrying forward their respective global missions. The ICJ has 
already been characterized as activist. 269 Those familiar with the history of 
U.S. federal courts and the ECJ will predict that, in this era at least, su-
pranational tribunals will accept broad authority, and members will 
ultimately concede the necessity to do so. For example, a former ICJ 
Registrar noted that Court's development in this direction: 
The impression I had initially when I came to the Court was that 
it appeared as if the intellectual effort was being made to dismiss 
cases on the ground of lack of jurisdiction in the period before 
1984, and that this effort had turned, rather, to try to find ways to 
267. See generally VRANKEN, supra note 79. 
268. An extreme example of judicial activism is the Indian Supreme Court's decision 
striking down a properly enacted constitutional amendment because the amendment violated 
fundamental rights. Jamie Cassels, Judicial Activism and Public Interest Litigation in India: 
Attempting the Impossible, 37 AM. J. CoMP. L. 495, 510 (1989). "[l]nconvenient Supreme Court 
decisions on the constitutionality of state action were simply overturned by amending the con-
stitution until the 'basic structure' of the constitution was declared unalterable." !d. at 501. On 
the other hand: ''The notion that the constitution has an unalterable basic structure remains a 
highly problematic and controversial element of Indian constitutional law." /d. at 50 I, n.34. 
269. American Society of International Law, International Law in Ferment and the World 
Court: A Discussion on the Role and Record of the International Court of Justice, 94 AM. Soc'y 
I NT' L L. PRoc. 172, 174 (2000) (recognizing, according to a former judge and several practitio-
ners, the justice of such a characterization). 
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assert the jurisdiction, and the Court went to some lengths to do 
that.21o 
59 
The WTO adjudicative bodies are likewise asserting themselves, as 
discussed in Part I. Given the evolution of their own courts, lawyers from 
both sides of the Atlantic will be comfortable with this trend. Indeed, 
those in tune with global goals will be quite happy with it. 
Another aspect of the civil law system that will assuage the civil law 
mind when confronted with activist global tribunals is the civil law's own 
use of courts technically outside the judiciary for tasks that require 
broader discretion. The French Council of State was created to review 
legislative and other government action. Since the Council was not part of 
the judiciary, it could engage in aggressive policy-oriented review271 Most 
civil law nations have separate administrative courts to insulate their 
regular courts from involvement with the government.272 Civil law sys-
tems have also established constitutional courts rather than authorize the 
"judiciary" to review legislation.273 These courts are not considered part of 
the judiciary, and hence, may engage in review of legislation consistent 
with civil law ideology. Through these courts, the civil law culture has 
become accustomed to judicial review, and those from civil law cultures 
will have fewer problems with global "courts" exercising functions tradi-
tionally prohibited to the civil law judiciary. 
There remains a distinction between how the civil and common law 
envision the judicial role in society. Common law judges are lawmakers, 
and hence, it is natural to conceive that common law judges have greater 
authority. It is certainly true that, in the aggregate, they are expected to 
evolve the law. Therefore, as an institution, a common law judiciary 
seems to have a more important social role than that of a civil law judici-
ary. The common law judiciary has more status in the system, as well. 
This status is enhanced in the legal community by the fact that common 
law judges come to the bench as successful members of the practicing 
bar. It is not difficult to see why both judges and the bar constantly press 
for a common law conception of the judicial role. Experience with mixed 
systems, those combining common law and civil law elements, suggests 
270. /d. at 175. Those unfamiliar with the ICJ should understand that the Registrar is an 
extremely important official. They head a staff that prepares the case for trial, and drafts judg-
ments, advisory opinions, and orders. They also check these documents before they are issued 
by the Court, as well as assist the judges much as law clerks assist U.S. judges. See RosENNE, 
supra note 19, at 442. 
271. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, fRENCH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND THE COMMON-LAW 
WoRLD II (1954) ("[The Council of State's] decisions were swayed just as much by policy as 
by law."). Many civil law systems borrowed the council of state model but have now removed 
the adjudicative function. 
272. WATKIN, supra note 81, at 370-71. 
273. LOUIS fAVOREU, CONSTITUTIONAL CoURTS 6 (2001). 
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that global tribunals and their bars will attempt to assert authority for their 
law-making powers using common law arguments.274 
As the two legal cultures conceive of a global judiciary, the source of 
authority in individual cases will also create a basis for contention. Civil 
law judges have discretion in deciding their cases, but the source of that 
discretion differs from the common law. In the civil law system, a court 
must find some delegation, sometimes implied, to do equity.275 In contrast, 
a common law judge has inherent authority derived from the separate eq-
uity tradition. 276 Since civil law judges interpret their authority to do 
equity, they might seem to have similar authority. But the nature of the 
distinction between the two cannot be ignored. On the world stage, civil 
law and common law lawyers and judges will be skeptical of each other's 
approach to equity authorization. Civil law judges and lawyers will argue 
authority based on some delegation, whereas common law judges and 
lawyers will assume that global judges will have inherent authority to 
consider individual fairness where they see fit. Both because civil law 
lawyers predominate and because assumptions of discretion, even to do 
individual fairness, are suspect, global legal culture will probably more 
closely resemble the civil law approach. Nonetheless, U.S. lawyers are 
not unarmed. Their administrative and constitutional law is rich with 
delegation jurisprudence. 
The two transatlantic legal cultures differ in the operation of their ju-
dicial hierarchy. While there is no established global hierarchy, rulings of 
the ICJ are usually given great deference by other supranational tribunals. 
However, a similar tendency is not apparent regarding trade. The WTO 
Appellate Body's pronouncements seem to hold no particular weight in 
other supranational trade tribunals. Rights tribunals do not feel bound by 
ICJ law either.277 This situation not only affects the nature of precedent, as 
described above, but it weakens the overall concept of a global judiciary. 
U.S. lawyers will favor a unified hierarchical judicial regime. They are 
accustomed to one Supreme Court of ultimate authority. More basically, 
the common law system of judicial law making requires an ultimate judi-
cial authority, but the civil law system does not need such a final judicial 
authority. 
274. PALMER, supra note 77, at 35-36. 
275. MERRYMAN, supra note 102, at 52-53. 
276. /d. at 51-52. 
277. "There is no hierarchy of courts with predetermined jurisdiction. Instead there exists 
a more complex and haphazard multiplicity of courts, with no pretense of schematic hierarchy 
between them." RosENNE, supra note 19, at 529. On the other hand: "While there is no formal 
hierarchy of international courts and tribunals, the pre-eminence of ... the present International 
Court is today generally accepted. Any other international adjudicatory body which ignored 
relevant dicta and decisions of the International Court would jeopardize its credibility." /d. at 
1609. 
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U.S. lawyers are likely to press the system to form a unified global 
judicial regime.278 Europeans, on the other hand, are more accustomed to 
separate court systems, and might not be as anxious to unify the courts.279 
The several global tribunals might have and could still form into a unified 
judicial regime, but civilians will not have the instinct to do so in a way 
that may well drive U.S. lawyers.280 They will see the WTO judiciary and 
the ICJ as founded on two very distinct governmental institutions whose 
"competences" should be kept separate. The need for different expertise is 
one of the forces that has kept supranational tribunals separate.281 
Europeans and Americans differ on the use of specialized court sys-
tems. Europeans are more familiar to separate court systems. The French 
have the Cassation, the final court for general law, and the Council of 
State, the final court for administrative law, along with a separate consti-
tutional council.282 The Germans have five separate court systems and a 
Constitutional Court. A constitutional court, separate from those that han-
dle regular legal issues, is the norm in civil law countries. 283 In the 
European supranational regime, the ECJ has jurisdiction over trade and 
the ECHR has jurisdiction over rights enforcement. The CFI provides 
another E. U. example of the continental European tendency to create spe-
cialist courts. 
Still, a unified system would no doubt provide coherence in the de-
velopment of global law, and coherence is essential to legitimacy. Indeed, 
the E.U. could be used as a counter-example to the civil law tendency 
toward establishing specialist courts. The ECJ, in the exercise of its trade 
jurisdiction, has taken on many rights-enforcement questions, and it 
would take little technical effort to shift jurisdiction over issues of rights 
into that court and create a supreme court of Europe. International law has 
278. Spelliscy, supra note 6, at 171 ("Given the disastrous consequences that incoherence 
could have on the international judicial system, it is time to abandon the orthodoxy and insist on 
the formalization of the relationships between tribunals."). 
279. See id. at 153-54. 
280. Jackson observed that the precursor to the WTO, the International Trade Organiza-
tion, would have had appeals to the "World Court," or in other words, the ICJ. John H. Jackson, 
Dispute Settlement and the WTO: Emerging Problems, in FROM GATT TO THE WTO: THE 
MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM 68-69 (2000). 
281. Spelliscy, supra note 6, at 149. 
282. Had the "star chamber" survived, it might have evolved into something like the 
French Council of State, and the common law world might have become accustom to a dual 
judicial system as well. Though vilified in history, that review body was a casualty of politics, 
not principles. LAWRENCE BAXTER, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 20 (1984) (pointing OUt that the Star 
Chamber was "fairly popular with the public" but "[c]ommon lawyers considered the court a 
threat to the jurisdiction of King's Bench."). 
283. WATKIN, supra note 81, at 6 ("Another hallmark of civil law systems therefore is 
their possession of a constitutional court or some such body to hear and determine [whether a 
particular piece of legislation offends against the fundamental law of the State]."). 
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never had a unified system.284 Nonetheless, the proliferation of global and 
supranational tribunals is increasingly creating incoherent and sometimes 
contradictory principles.285 Consistency and certainty suffer, so that in the 
end the U.S. legal view may have the strongest practical case. 
E. Procedure 
Much of the tension in the emerging global legal culture will revolve 
around procedural principles. Tension will arise at the theoretical level 
because procedural principles express a legal culture's understanding of 
fundamental fairness, making alien ideas about process inherently sus-
pect. Practicalities also fuel this tension because practical lawyers will 
feel disadvantaged by unfamiliar procedural designs. 
A significant gulf exists between the common law "adversarial" 
model and the civil law "inquisitorial" model. The common law lawyer 
has been traumatized by the "star chamber" horror story ever since the 
English judges helped parliament triumph over the executive-monarch. 
The very term "inquisitorial" calls up these horrible images. On the other 
hand, much about the adversarial model offends fundamental instincts 
among civil lawyers as well. In fact, these terms do not capture the true 
difference between the two models. The overarching contrast is the rela-
tive position of lawyers and judges. Civil processes are adversarial in their 
own way, and one would hope that the common law process aims at in-
quiring into the truth. They differ in the techniques employed to assure 
participation and discovery of the truth. 
The judge-managed process of the civil law has advantages in assur-
ing equality of opportunity. As described above, once the parties have 
brought a case to court, the court assumes responsibility for the effective 
handling of the case.286 In contrast, common law pleadings merely get the 
plaintiff into the courthouse. The lawyers must then develop the case and 
284. See Jonathan Charney, The Implications of Expanding International Dispute Settle-
ment Systems: The 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 69,74 (1996) 
(noting that the ICJ, and the PCIJ before it, promoted the rule of law "in the context of a mixed 
system that allows for a variety of other forums to decide matters of international law."); 
Carl-August Fleischbauer, The Relationship between the international Court of Justice and the 
Newly Created International Tribuna/for the Law of the Sea in Hamburg, 1 MAX PLANCK Y.B. 
U.N. L. 327, 333 (1997) (discussing how the ICJ and the Hamburg Tribunal will divide interna-
tional legal cases and labor). 
285. See Spelliscy, supra note 6, at 159-68 (discussing the conflicting views of the ICJ 
and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia regarding state responsibility 
for acts of state officials). While the ICTY trial level court applied the ICJ precedent, the appel-
late body explicitly refused to apply ICJ law. Id. at 167-68. 
286. Issues and evidence, however, are still controlled by the parties. See MERRYMAN, 
supra note 102, at 111-23. 
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build the record, with the judges acting more like referees. The informa-
tion that becomes the record will be validated during trial. 287 
The role of the trial itself is quite different between the two systems. 
A common law trial is the end product; all the real work is done at trial, 
and everything else is preparatory. In contrast, the civil law depends on a 
process, with the trial some part of that process. It is not usually the 
dominant part, except when the final decision is made. 
The civil law depends much more on writing. The common law dis-
trusts written proceedings.288 Its oral orientation requires writing to be 
converted essentially into testimony and validated by admission at trial 
under specific rules of admissibility. In short, the relative competence of 
the parties' lawyers determines the effectiveness and equality of opportu-
nity in the common law process, whereas the civil law process focuses 
more on a sense of fairness and the sensitivity of its judges. 
The civil law's focus on judge control is in many aspects more ap-
propriate to the global tribunals. Judicial control assures that the court 
itself has an adequate record. Civil law procedures allow the court to 
consult experts, including legal experts, more readily. The adversarial 
process would require most experts to appear as witnesses, and hence 
limiting their usefulness to the court. Section II.C. describes the ECJ's 
incorporation of the preparatory judge and the judicial advisor. In that 
court, the case is assigned to a "judge-reporter" who prepares the docket, 
while the court relies upon the legal advice of an "advocate general" who 
287. Thibaut and Walker, in their empirical study of the two, found that institutionalization 
of either the adversarial process or its continental rival have an affect on the type of facts pre-
sented tO fact finders. JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A 
PsYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSis 39-40 (1975). They demonstrated that the "inquisitorial" process 
used on the continent has disadvantages in confronting sampling error. "However, this study has 
identified a major, and heretofore unsuspected, effect of adversary decision making: the model 
introduces a systematic evidentiary bias in favor of the party disadvantaged by the discovered 
facts." /d. at 40. That is, the adversary process creates an incorrect view of the balance of infor-
mation where the weight of the evidence clearly rests on one side of the controversy. On the 
other hand, another process may create other accuracy biases, as does the "inquisitorial" model. 
The fundamental procedural choice is actually based on the "brand" of inaccuracy preferred in 
the legal culture. In general, the U.S. system of procedural design is committed to the adversar-
ial process because it focuses on the quality rather than the quantity of the evidence. 
288. However, increased use of written materials may be making its way into English 
courts. See T.H. Bingham, "There Is a World Elsewhere?": The Changing Perspectives of Eng-
lish Law, 41 lNT'L & CoMP. L.Q. (1992) 513, 526 ("[I]f a judge of (say) the immediate 
post-war period were to return to the courts today, whether at first instance or on appeal, he 
would feel himself to be in an environment that would feel quite strange and, as he might think, 
un-English."). 
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prepares a thorough legal analysis.289 The Court may order expert reports 
under the supervision of the judge-reporter.290 
These aspects of the inquisitorial model will offend common lawyers 
who are used to having greater control of their cases. Understandably, 
lawyers prefer the common law procedure in which they are dominant. 
Empirical evidence suggests that the judge-controlled process is less sat-
isfactory to ordinary citizens as well. 291 Yet, great diversity within the 
judiciary argues in favor of helper judges. In addition, the unequal quality 
of representation among participants in global litigation will be mitigated 
by the ability of the court to control the record. Given the even greater 
likely disparity in the resources available to litigants in global adjudica-
tions, the civil law use of court experts, rather than the common law's 
insistence that experts appear for the litigants as witnesses, surely will 
enhance the technical competence and equality of judicial deci-
. aki 292 swn-m ng. 
Process in the two systems may also conflict at the appellate level. In 
contrast to the U.S. inclination, the civil law empowers appellate courts to 
289. KOEN LENAERTS ET AL., PROCEDURAL LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION § 1-011 
(1999). 
290. Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice of the European Communities, art. 49, 
1991 OJ. (L 176) 7, available at http://curia.eu.int/en/instit/txtdocfr/main.htm. 
291. However, Thibaut and Walker, in their empirical study of the two process models, 
provided an in-<lepth empirical examination into the factors that ensure satisfaction in a legal 
process. See THIBAUT & WALKER, supra note 287, at 1-5; see also Paul R. Verkuil, A Study of 
Informal Adjudication Procedures, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 739, 750--60 (1976). Thibaut and Walker 
compared the so-called "adversary" process, the passive decision-maker model, with its conti-
nental rival, the active decision-maker model unfortunately termed "inquisitory" process. They 
found that: "One of the most intriguing findings for participant subjects was the linear increase 
in satisfaction with the procedure, perceived fairness of the procedure, and opportunity for evi-
dence presentation as the procedural mode moved along the continuum from the inquisitorial to 
the choice adversary method." THIBAUT & WALKER, supra, at 94. Other studies have confirmed 
this finding in various settings. E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF 
PROCEDURAL JusncE 211-14 (1988). Uninvolved observers and continental subjects (those not 
habituated to the adversarial process) showed a similar preference for the adversary process. See 
THIBAUT & WALKER, supra, at 77-80. This satisfaction emanates from leveling, even though it 
distorts the true balance of factual support for one of the positions. /d. at 77. Also, they found 
that "subjects are more willing to trust an adversary system than an inquisitorial attorney to 
produce accurate, unbiased judgments." !d. (emphasis in the original). That is, participants and 
observers were impressed by the adversarial model's restraints on the conduct of the decision 
makers. 
292. The limitation of certain types of expert evidence in WTO panels has caused some 
controversy. While statutes confirm that the panels have broad authority to investigate and 
evaluate the facts in each case, WTO Appellate Body decisions indicate that some evidence is 
now limited to the explanations and evaluations of the evidence provided by the parties. Joost 
Pauwelyn, The Use of Experts in WTO Dispute Settlement, 51 lNT'L & COMP. L.Q. 325, 354 
(2002) ("It unduly restricts the inquisitorial role of WTO panels as international tribunals and 
constitutes an unwarranted transplantation of common law principles into the WTO process.") 
(emphasis added). 
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engage in de novo review. 293 This may be a natural extension of the choice 
of judicial control versus lawyer control. Since the parties are responsible 
for the common law record, it is natural that the courts should accept 
"their" record. Whereas, since the judiciary is responsible for the civil law 
record, it is natural that each level of the court system should check on the 
record, as well as the application of the law to the record. Regardless, 
civil law and common law practitioners will have very different expecta-
tions at the appellate level as well as the "trial" level. Perhaps because of 
U.S. influence, global tribunals with appellate authority are limited to 
questions of law.294 Because of the complexity of fact-finding in global 
disputes, this common law-type appellate review might be best solution. 
Lawyers and jurists from the two systems might disagree about the 
function of reviewing courts in any global judicial hierarchy. Based on the 
French model, the highest courts in civil law systems are likely to be 
courts of "cassation." Cassation means that the reviewing court may 
"quash" a lower court decision it finds to be incorrect, but may not sub-
stitute its judgment for that of the lower court.295 The reviewing court is 
limited to returning the case for reconsideration. Common law practitio-
ners will expect global courts to conduct appeals. Experience with mixed 
civil and common law systems show a natural tendency for courts to 
1 . f 1 296 evo ve mto courts o appea . 
The procedures for supervision of state courts by a central judiciary 
will be another source of tension. U.S. lawyers are likely to be shocked by 
some ideas that might come out of the E.U. procedures. In the U.S., the 
Supreme Court may only review state decisions involving federal issues 
that have been addressed by the highest state court. The E.U. has a "pre-
liminary ruling mechanism" that allows any member tribunal, no matter 
how lowly, to refer E.U. questions directly to the ECJ.297 A former presi-
dent of the ICJ has recommended that a similar mechanism be available 
so that national courts may refer international questions directly to the 
ICJ.298 U.S. lawyers will be very uncomfortable with such an approach. 
Of course, questions of procedural design have already been ad-
dressed in the global arena. Where the U.S. participates, the U.S. has had 
293. See generally VRANKEN, supra note 79. 
294. The WTO is a good example. Debra P. Steger & Susan M. Hainsworth, New Direc-
tions in International Trade Law: WTO Dispute Settlement, DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN THE 
WoRLD TRADE ORGANISATION 31 (James Cameron & Karen Campbell eds., 1998); Terence P. 
Stewart & Amy S. Dwyer, HANDBOOK ON WTO TRADE REMEDY DISPUTES: THE FIRST SIX 
YEARS (1995-2000) 2 (2001). 
295. ANDREW WEST ET AL., THE FRENCH LEGAL SYSTEM 86 (2d ed. 1998). 
296. PALMER, supra note 77, at 39 (discussing the evolution of the Puerto Rican Supreme 
Court from a classic cassational style to a court of appeals). 
297. E.U. TREATY, supra note 36, art. 234 (ex art. 177). 
298. American Society oflnternational Law, supra note 269, at 181. 
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its way on procedural issues. The U.S. has been able to insist on adver-
sarial-type hearings. As more and more "regular," non-international 
practitioners find themselves engaged in these global tribunals, the ten-
sion will increase. Civil law lawyers may be less accepting of common 
law processes. And common law practitioners may begin to recognize 
that non-practitioners have been willing to trade substantive principles for 
process. In short, the current detente on procedure, such as it is, may not 
be as stable as it seems.299 
F. Impact of Non-Judicial Institutions 
Not directly related to conflict between the civil law and common law 
systems as such, but nonetheless equally important to anticipating global 
judicial regimes, is the contrast in the judiciary's overall position in gov-
ernment between a parliamentary system and a presidential system. The 
different principles behind the position of the judiciary in these two gov-
ernmental models will reach into the global legal culture. Here, the U.S. 
will diverge from even its common law partners. 
The U.S. version of separation of powers structurally divides the two 
political functions into the legislative and executive governmental 
branches. In the parliamentary system, the executive, or "government," is 
the leadership of the legislative. An informal separation exists between 
the 'ins' and the 'outs', rather than an institutional separation between 
legislative and executive actors as in the presidential system. Not only 
will the outs include the minority parties in the legislature, but also the 
non-leadership "backbenchers" of the controlling party or parties. The 
key separation in the parliamentary system then is between the 
democratic institutions of government and the judiciary. The 
parliamentary system reinforces the civil law conception of the role of the 
courts in which the courts have a specially-defined function regarding 
litigation with the government, often to guarantee that courts do not 
interfere in the business of government. But even common law 
parliamentary systems ensure separation between the political branches 
and the judiciary. England, the font of the common law, evidences the 
299. Jackson criticizes the WTO/GATI dispute settlement structure for its ossification of 
procedure. As many as 80 changes, most involving "fine tuning," have been proposed. The De-
cision on the Application and Review of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing 
the Settlement of Disputes, available at http://www. wto.org/english/docs_e!legal_e/ 
53-ddsv.pdf, calls for a review of procedures. Jackson notes: "One of the geniuses of GAIT ... 
was its ability to evolve partly through trial and error and practice." Jackson, supra note 280, at 
77. In contrast, he observed constraints on a similar evolutionary process regarding procedures. 
/d. Surely, there is value in stabilizing procedures because of the number and diversity of par-
ticipants with various resources. Still, creating a judicial regime for the whole world should 
justify a good deal of new thinking and experimentation. Of course this may be a mere expres-
sion of an U.S. lawyer's obsession with procedure. 
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long struggle between an elite judiciary and a representative parliament, 
which justified creation of a "parliamentary sovereignty."300 
On the other hand, the presidential model empowers the judiciary. 
Separation of the executive from the legislative branch in the presidential 
system puts the courts in the position of arbiter between the two political 
branches. Thus, the presidential model enhances judicial authority be-
cause the judiciary is the ultimate institution to mediate between the 
executive and the legislature. Because most parliamentary systems com-
bine control of the two political functions, the judiciary is weakened by its 
position of second-guessing the majoritarian institutions of government. 
It is difficult to predict how separation of powers theory will play out 
in the global community. The E.U. has evolved closer to a U.S. separation 
of powers system, even though it consists of countries with a parliamen-
tary system.301 Perhaps there is a natural tendency in the direction of the 
U.S. view that will play out in the global arena. One useful global ex-
perience is the Lockerbie case discussed above. 302 The case involved 
Libya's resistance to U.S. and U.K. efforts to extradite those who planted 
the bomb that caused the crash over Lockerbie, Scotland. Libya filed its 
case with the ICJ in conflict with a U.N. Security Council decision. The 
ICJ's resolution of the conflict established that both the Council and the 
Court have certain quasi-judicial functions. 303 Nonetheless, the Court 
made it clear that, while it is bound to cooperate with the other "principle 
organs," the ICJ is equally bound by considerations of internationallaw.304 
On the other hand, its decision-making may not be confined to such con-
siderations. 305 While the ICJ ducked a direct confrontation with the 
Council by applying a separation of powers-related concept similar to the 
U.S. "political question" doctrine, it asserted its own authority to review 
non-judicial institutions. 
300. WADE & FoRSYTH, supra note 72, at 29. In addition: 
/d. 
The sovereignty of Parliament is a peculiar feature of the British constitution which 
exerts a constant and powerful influence. In particular, it is an ever-present threat to 
the position of the courts; and it naturally inclines the judges towards caution in their 
attitude to the executive, since Parliament is effectively under the executive's control. 
301. See Bignami, supra note 93, at 468-69. 
302. Concerning Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Con-
vention Arising From the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. U.S.), 19921.CJ. 114 (Apr. 14). 
303. Vera Gowlland-Debbas, The Relationship Between the International Court of Justice 
and the Security Council in the Light of the Lockerbie Case, 88 AM. J. INT'L L.643, 661 (1994). 
304. /d. at 674. 
305. RoSENNE, supra note 19, at 118 ("[W]hile the Court's task is limited to functions of a 
legal character, its power of action and decision is subject to no limitation deriving from the fact 
that the dispute before it might also be part of a dispute which is within the competence of some 
other organ."). 
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The distinctions of the two governmental models also affect judicial 
authority over administrative acts. Legislative and administrative acts are 
more clearly distinguished in the presidential model, and hence courts 
have been able to assume significant authority. Similar action in parlia-
mentary systems is evidence of another type of legislation-making 
judicial assertion of authority that is antidemocratic, rather than protective 
of the citizenry.306 The very terms used to describe administrative func-
tioning express the great gulf between judicial treatment in the two 
systems. In the U.S., it is called 'rulemaking,' and in the parliamentary 
system it is called 'delegated legislation,' or subordinate legislation. 
Delegated legislation, as administrative pronouncements delegated to the 
government-part of the legislature, properly takes on the aspects of legis-
lation. From a judicial review perspective, they are much the same as 
legislation. In the U.S., such administrative pronouncements are concep-
tually distinct from the legislation which they are intended to 
implement.307 Pronouncements made pursuant to delegated authority, or 
"legislative rules," have special force, even though not classified as actual 
1 '1' 308 egis atwn. 
The E.U. experience, leaning more toward separation of powers than 
its parliamentary members, suggests that a global legal regime will in-
clude administrative "legislation" more akin to the U.S. mode.309 The 
306. It seems consistent that administrative interpretations have less force in civil law 
systems than in a U.S. common law system. DE CRUZ, supra note 145, at 269. 
307. Another manifestation of the separation between the judicial and political institutions 
in civil law is the careful distinction between public law and private law. U.S. law is not without 
this dichotomy, but it is not as grounded as it is under the civil law. Indeed, these categories go 
back to Roman law. In the U.S., the government is not "protected" by separate courts. Not only 
is the government subjected to oversight by generalist courts, but U.S. thinking is that such a 
system is necessary. Remember, the U.S. believes that the judiciary is the least dangerous 
branch. However, review of government decisions by generalist judges is suspect, and hence 
limited by several doctrines, e.g., political question, of administrative law. 
308. In our system, the Harmonized Tariff Schedules of the United States (HTSUS) must 
be characterized as legislative rules. HTSUS are "recommended" by the International Trade 
Commission, and issued by presidential decree. 19 U.S.C. §§ 3004-3006 (2002). They are in-
corporated by reference into the statute itself. 19 U.S.C. § 1202. It is most nearly our system's 
equivalent to "delegated legislation" as found in a parliamentary system. Delegated legislation is 
literally legislation made by the executive, which is part of the legislature. See, e.g., WADE & 
FoRSYTH, supra note 72, at 859. In our system, however, where the legislative and the executive 
are constitutionally separate, Congress cannot delegate actual legislative authority, and hence 
rulemaking may not be considered "legislation." Thus, the HTSUS must be seen as legislative 
rules made pursuant to delegated authority. See Chrysler v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 304-06, 99 S. 
Ct. 1705 ( 1979) (inquiring into whether an executive order represents sufficient delegation to be 
considered "law"). 
309. The dominant procedural requirements for E.U. "secondary legislation," or rulemak-
ing, were established by the "Comitology" decisions. The Commission may adopt rules under 
the indirect control of the Council. Control is indirect because a committee of Member State 
experts is charged with day-to-day supervision of Commission rulemaking. The second Comi-
tology decision gave parliament power similar to legislative veto. Council Decision 
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E.U.; however, represents more of a middle ground between the presiden-
tial and parliamentary models. The U.S. will view administrative 
pronouncements as lacking legislative-like weight, but E. U. adherents 
might see it as "secondary legislation." The former will carry the author-
ity of an executive interpretation of a statute. The latter, to some extent, 
will carry the authority of the legislature itself. These characterizations 
will substantially affect judicial freedom in the face of such pronounce-
ments. 
Differences in separation of powers ideology can also affect judicial 
participation in the legislative process itself. Advisory judicial opinions 
are more readily accepted in continental European systems than in the 
U.S.310 Europeans are likely to push for an advisory role for global tribu-
nals or for tribunals designed for that purpose, replicating the 
constitutional courts. French President Jacques Chirac advocated that the 
ICJ be invested with a "regulatory role, advising international organiza-
tions with advisory opinions requested to reconcile in cases where the 
international law of environment, trade, and labor standards conflict."311 
U.S. courts are constitutionally prohibited from issuing advisory opin-
ions.312 In contrast, the constitutional courts of many nations regularly 
engage in advisory opinions.313 Legislators are often specifically author-
ized to take legislation to the constitutional court. Legislative standing in 
the U.S., in contrast, is not permitted.314 The ECJ has expressed jurisdic-
tion over parliamentary actions against the other E.U. institutions. The 
two approaches to judicial advice might be hard to reconcile, but the U.S. 
might accept the continental approach because its prohibition is based on 
the constitutional language and not the rationality of the concept. 
G. Qualification and Selection of Global Judges 
Another sensitive aspect of the global judicial regime will be the 
mundane question of judicial selection and qualification. The tension 
1999/468/EC, 1999 OJ. (L 184) 23. See Christoph Demmke et al., The History ofComitology, 
in SHAPING EUROPEAN LAW AND POLICY: THE ROLE OF COMMITTEES AND COMITOLOGY IN 
THE POLITICAL PROCEss 61 (Robin H. Ped1er & Guenther F. Schaefer eds., 1996); Ellen Vos, 
The Rise of Committees, 3 EuR. LJ. 210 (1997). Generally, rules involving significant norma-
tive choices require more procedures than those involving routine administrative matters. 
310. See HELFER & SLAUGHTER, supra note 1, at 312-14. 
311. Speech of Jacques Chirac, quoted in American Society of International Law, supra 
note 269, at 180. 
312. JoHN E. NowAK & RoNALD D. RoTUNDA, CoNsTITUTIONAL LAw 56 (6th ed. 1995). 
313. FAVOREU, supra note 273, at 22-23 (noting, however, that the extent to which con-
stitutional courts engage in a priori review is decreasing). 
314. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811,828 (1997) ("There would be nothing irrational about a 
system which granted standing in these cases; some European constitutional courts operate 
under one or another variant of such a regime .... But it is obviously not the regime that has 
obtained under our Constitution to date."). 
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between the common law view of the nature of the judiciary and that of 
the civil law goes deeper than conflict over representation and 
professional qualifications. Common law judges are amateur judges. That 
is, they are not trained or apprenticed as judges, and are selected from 
among practicing lawyers. As discussed above, civil law judges are 
trained as judges, and they move up a hierarchy as they prove themselves 
at lower levels. They are products of a judicial bureaucracy, "faceless 
bureaucrats."315 Common lawyers are likely to be appalled by such judges, 
just as civil law lawyers are likely to be appalled by the lack of training 
and experience of common law judges.316 
The two selection regimes no doubt change the actual judicial deci-
sion-making. For one thing, common law judges, coming from the same 
fraternity, find practitioner judges more acceptable. Studies show that 
practicing lawyers, not surprisingly, bring their practice perspective with 
them to the bench. 317 Civil lawyers might find that this tendency detracts 
from the integrity and impartiality of judicial decision-making. Common 
lawyers may find that civil law judges lack the touch of reality, and have 
the propensity to over-conceptualize. Yet, civil law judges have their own 
brand of experience-experience at being judges. Representatives of 
those systems may be forgiven for believing that that experience is supe-
rior and less likely to create bias. 
315. Civil law opinions are collegial; they are the opinion of the court. Common law 
judges identify themselves. Common law lawyers are accustomed to working with the identity 
of judges, not just appellate judges. There are good and bad justifications of both, but there is 
certainly a choice which might be rectified intellectually, albeit more difficult to satisfy practi-
tioners. At present, the WTO appellate tribunal does not identify the individual judicial views. 
Jackson, supra note 280, at 71 ("There is no indication of particular authorship of any part of an 
Appellate Body report and no provision for dissenting opinions."). However, a recent WTO 
Appellate Body decision may suggest that this is changing. In the Asbestos case, one of the 
panelists wrote a concurring opinion, changing the long-standing practice to write unanimous 
opinions. WTO Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Measures Affecting Asbestos 
and Asbestos-Containing Products, WTO Doc. WT/DSI35/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001). The ECHR, 
however, is an example of a supranational judicial body that does allow for both dissenting and 
concurring opinions. Convention For the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 51(2), 213 U.N.T.S. 221. 
316. Lord Goff discusses the quality of common law judges, stating that it is experience 
that counts most in common law systems. The essential quality of the judge then is not knowl-
edge, but wisdom. Goff, supra note 103, at 755. Mixed common--civil law jurisdictions suggest 
a natural tendency toward selecting experienced practitioners where the civil law tradition of 
specialized training is not in place, choosing experience over education. See PALMER, supra note 
77, at 37. 
317. Gregory C. Sisk et al., Charting the Influences on the Judicial Mind: An Empirical 
Study of Judicial Reasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1377, 1470 (1998) ("Although we initially 
shared [skepticism about the impact of prior employment], our study found nearly every prior 
employment variable of these judges, with the exceptions of law professor and political experi-
ence (and perhaps prosecutorial experience), to be significant in some manner."). 
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The European judicial selection was made flexible in order to ac-
commodate its common law members' judicial traditions. With the U.K. 
and Ireland, prominent members of the European community, qualifica-
tion of European judges had to accommodate the difference between 
common law and civil law judicial selection. Thus, candidates for both 
the ECJ and ECHR must satisfy alternative qualifications.318 Candidates 
qualify under the agreements either as qualified for judicial appointment 
in the national court or as those "who are jurisconsults of recognized 
competence."319 These criteria recognize scholarship as a qualification for 
judges in accord with civil law respect for jurists, as well as the common 
law insistence on practical legal experience and reputation. 
A similar divide can be expected, as global tribunals become more 
court-like. Qualification for membership on the ICJ offers a similar com-
promise. Judges are qualified if they have "qualification required in their 
respective countries for appointment to the highest judicial office, or are 
jurisconsults of recognized competence in international law."320 Indeed, 
other alternatives might be contemplated to satisfy other legal cultures. 
Characteristics of the adjudicators functioning in the WTO dispute 
process reflect more the political, negotiation character of the process 
than a true adjudicative character. The initial or "trial" level proceeding is 
conducted by "Dispute Panels," the qualifications for which is prior ser-
vice on or representation during a panel, previous employ as a 
government representative under GATT, employ as a Secretariat expert, 
having a scholarly record in international trade law or policy, or having 
served as a Member's senior trade policy official. 321 Members of the Ap-
pellate Body must have recognized standing in international law or trade. 
To some extent the acceptance of scholarly background leans more to-
wards the civil law approach. But in the end, the WTO bodies are not 
currently peopled by judicial types under either legal culture. Thus, if 
these bodies become more court-like in operation, the question of selec-
tion and qualification of real judicial officials will have to satisfy those 
318. See L. NEVILLE BROWN & TOM KENNEDY, THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EURO-
PEAN COMMUNITIES 49-50 (5th ed. 2000). 
319. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Nov. ]0, 1997, art. 223 (ex art. 
167), O.J. (C 340) 3 (1997). 
320. Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 2, 59 Stat. 1055, 
1055, 3 Bevans 1179, 1179, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/ (last visited Jan. 12, 2004). See 
also RosENNE, supra note 19, at 397 (criticizing the order in which these two alternatives are 
written, because experience at the highest domestic judicial office does not assure expertise in 
international law). 
321. KONSTANTINOS ADAMANTOPOULOS, AN ANATOMY OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANI-
ZATION 61-62 (1997); see also DAVID PALMETER & PETROS C. MAVROJDJS, DISPUTE 
SETTLEMENT IN THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 68-69 (1999). 
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from both legal cultures. Again, the "judicial" nature of the adjudicators 
may be a characteristic that must satisfy diverse legal cultures. 
Perceptions of the necessary characteristics for independence are also 
likely areas of tension. The U.S. is strongly committed to the value of life 
tenure. The E. U ., true to its civil law roots, believes that a term of years is 
in fact the best way to assure independence.322 It is very unlikely that 
global tribunals will ever have life tenure judges, for reasons that are more 
political than choosing the legal system. The best chance for judicial in-
dependence will be prohibition against reappointment. 
Another independence issue, although not necessarily to pit transat-
lantic participants against each other, is national representation in 
supranational judicial bodies. Because of Congressional participation in 
the selection of federal judges, U.S. federal courts generally have local 
representation. In the E.U., all its institutions, parliament, commission, 
council, and the courts, explicitly incorporate Member State identity. The 
ECJ, as a practical matter, assures representation from each member.323 
The E.U. itself, however, recognizes that it must change in light of expan-
• 324 
SlOn. 
At present, and in any foreseeable future, global tribunals will be sen-
sitive to national or regional representation. However, real equality of 
representation is impossible because of the size of the world community. 
What must replace national representation is sensitivity to representation 
from various legal cultures. The ICJ has adopted this approach. Article 9 
provides: 
At every election, the electors [UN members] shall bear in mind 
not only that the persons to be elected should individually possess 
the qualifications required, but also that in the body as a whole 
the representation of the main forms of civilization and of the 
principal legal systems of the world should be assured. 325 
This must certainly be a difficult judgment, but a necessary spirit.326 
322. E.U. TREATY, supra note 36, art. 223 (ex art. 167) ('The Judges ... shall be ap-
pointed by common accord of the governments of the Member States for a term of six years."). 
323. Brown & Kennedy, supra note 318, at 48 (explaining that it is not required, but since 
each member must agree on an appointment, states will insist on representation). 
324. Alan Dash wood, The Constitution of the European Union After Nice: Law-Making 
Procedures, 26 EuR. L. REv. 215, 216 (2001); Jan Wouters, Institutional and Constitutional 
Challenges for the European Union-Some Reflections in the Light of the Treaty of Nice, 26 EuR. 
L. REv. 342, 343 (2001) (criticizing, unfairly in light of recent events, the Nice Intergovern-
mental Conference for not contemplating reforms beyond those needed for expansion). 
325. Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 320, art. 9. See also SHABTAI 
ROSENNE, THE WORLD COURT: WHAT IT IS AND HOW IT WORKS 54-62 (5th ed. 1995). 
326. One possibility is the well-recognized comparative law groups called "legal fami-
lies." DAVID & BRIERLEY, supra note 110, at 17-20. As discussed in Section III.F., these legal 
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H. Legal Representation Before Global Tribunals 
In the end, the practice of law gives substance and reality to the rule 
of law. Its success will be determined by the successful merger of princi-
ples and theory, which separate legal representation around the world. 
Until recently, the practice of law has been largely a local or, at most, a 
national enterprise, and implementation of the rule of law has struggled 
within many isolated venues. In our emerging global society, a coherent 
vision of the rule of law becomes an imperative. Hence, insulated legal 
practices are no longer acceptable. 
The practice of law in the world's legal systems can be quite differ-
ent. Indeed, culture may have more to do with the practice of law than 
legal theory. Global practice will witness diversity among the various 
cultures of the world, even those adopting one of the transatlantic models. 
Whereas this Article notes some major ideological distinctions between 
two major legal cultures, the practice of law among common law systems 
varies greatly, as does the practice of law among civil law systems. Even 
at their base, civil law systems differ among themselves. For example, 
French civil law was intended to make lawyers unnecessary, and even 
though it does not accomplish that, its legal culture is influenced by that 
philosophy. German law seeks to provide legal certainty and faithfulness 
to the past. 327 Law as practiced in the U.S. differs substantially from prac-
tice in England and Ireland. In short, the style and nature of representation 
in the global arena will experience clashes of multiple cultures, even 
within the larger categories of civil and common law. 
Faithfulness to language in authoritative documents will be a major 
area of tension. The degree of attention common and civil law representa-
tives pay to language is likely to differ. As discussed, statutory language 
can no more be ignored in the common law systems, even in the U.S., 
than in the civil law systems. In the end, a court must obey statutory lan-
guage in either system. Nonetheless, U.S. representatives must be 
prepared to argue from authoritative language in a way that seems some-
what literal and repressed to them. On the other hand, civil law advocates 
may find themselves somewhat freed by their association with common 
law representatives. They might find themselves plumbing new ap-
proaches to language. Indeed, this experience might support the 
movement in the civil law away from the grammatical approach, and it 
may give more credence to a certain degree of formalism in U.S. juris-
prudence. 
families may offer a device whereby the global legal culture may coordinate the various world 
legal cultures. See ZwEIGERT & KoTz, supra note 83, at 63-73. 
327. MERRYMAN, supra note ] 02, at 31-32. 
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The treatment of case law is the second major area of tension that will 
affect representation. Most likely, as justified above, precedent will have 
force in the global legal culture, but will never attain the binding effect it 
has in common law jurisprudence. As discussed, precedent does influence 
civil law, so that the difference between systems is really one of degree. 
Supranational tribunals seem inclined to value precedent, and the dynam-
ics of creating a global legal culture itself demands reference to prior 
judicial treatment. Legal historians explain that case authority depended 
historically on the availability of judicial opinions in England.328 Since the 
cases were available, common law lawyers and judges naturally used 
them in support of their positions, especially in the power grab of the 
formative years. 329 This experience suggests that the readily available re-
ports of the decisions of global tribunals will necessarily lead to a more 
precedent-oriented advocacy in the global legal culture. Rosenne said of 
the ICJ, "The constant accretion of judicial precedents is creating what is 
now a substantial body of international case-law."330 Representatives will 
naturally refer to prior decisions in support of their positions, even if 
those decisions have no formal stare decisis effect. It will be hard for 
lower level tribunals to ignore related decisions by appeals tribunals. 
Similarly, appeals tribunals will find it difficult to avoid their own prior 
decisions. Add the common law practitioners' inclination to use prior au-
thority and it can be predicted that a case-oriented representation and 
judicial decision-making will become part of the global legal culture. 
The common law glorifies lawyers and gives them ultimate control 
over the law. Judges are practitioners who see legal representation from 
the perspective of practicing lawyers. Legal analysis then will also differ 
depending on the sources considered to be the best authority. Civilians 
can be expected to advocate from scholarly works with more force than 
common law advocates. As noted above, in the civil law, scholars actually 
propound the law, whereas in common law, scholarship seeks to explain 
and influence the law made by judges.331 In practice, however, lawyers in 
lower courts rarely cite jurists, even in civil law systems.332 The real ten-
sion will come when civil lawyers expect their jurists to have compelling 
328. See CATHERINE DRINKER BOWEN, THE LION AND THE THRONE: THE LIFE AND 
TIMES OF SIR EDWARD COKE (1552-1634) 507 (1956) ("Even Francis Bacon acknowledged it. 
'Had it not been for Sir Edward Coke's Reports ... the law by this time had been almost like a 
ship without ballast, for that the cases of modem experience are fled from those that are ad-
judged and ruled in former time.'"). 
329. See generally COKE, supra note 192. 
330. ROSENNE, supra note 19, at 1609. 
331. See GLENN, supra note 90, at 227 (describing the emergence of "judges actually 
making law (and binding law at that)."). 
332. See LAWSON, supra note 120, at 84 ("I have heard advocates say that they rarely cite 
the views of jurists before any court lower than the Cour de Cassation ... "). 
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force at the "appellate," or law-developing, stage. They will expect 
scholars to have significant practical impact, and representatives from 
other cultures, e.g., an Islamic legal culture, will also give special weight 
to the work of legal scholars. Even in the common law, scholars have 
considerable weight in appellate decisions. Again, the difference is one of 
degree and form. 
Each group of representatives will rely on familiar techniques, and 
will incorporate familiar strategies. On the other hand, representatives 
will make the best arguments they can. Therefore, global practice will 
find common law advocates arguing from authoritative language as well 
as jurists' comments, and civil law advocates arguing from judicial opin-
ions and a balancing of interests approach. Global judges will likely find 
themselves justifying their decisions in similarly flexible ways. In short, 
the global practice of law will borrow from all cultures. That does not 
diminish the overarching premise of this Article: that the subtle differ-
ences among legal cultures must be understood as their representatives 
engage in the process of fashioning a global legal culture. 
CONCLUSION 
Globalization will necessarily lead to an ever-stronger union of con-
stituent states under an increasingly empowered supranational 
government. Judicial institutions will develop in this government. Global 
tribunals will become increasingly more like courts over the years. This 
prediction is relatively easy because the evolutionary process is already 
moving well along. The exact contours of the judicial institution are still 
to be determined, but the WTO Dispute Settlement Body, combined with 
the human rights adjudicators of the ICJ, provide very viable 
first-generation antecedents. 
Envisioning the legal culture that will emerge from these suprana-
tional tribunals is more problematic. This Article has attempted to provide 
the framework for projecting the evolution of the global legal culture. Its 
major subtext is the practical necessity for U.S. readers to learn about the 
world's legal cultures, starting with the often quite unfamiliar ideologies 
and practices of the continental European systems. It observes that the 
two dominant legal cultures in the world are now the civil law system and 
the common law system. Together they form at least a significant com-
ponent of 62% of the world's jurisdictions, covering 70% of its 
population. To add some coherence, the U.S. is cast as the major common 
law system, and the E.U. represents the manifestation of civil law juris-
prudence. A look to these two transatlantic systems is justified by the fact 
that both are federal in the sense that they represent a union of several 
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sovereigns, and hence their experience with legal unification will serve 
the global legal culture. Their dominance in that global legal culture 
might be supported by their current influence on both the world culture 
and the world's economy. 
The vision of this Article can be no more than a look at the first gen-
eration. Strong and influential alternatives to these transatlantic legal 
cultures will no doubt cause continual reworking of the global legal cul-
ture. Islamic law, for example, covers in some way perhaps a billion 
people, nearly 19% of the world's population, or the same as the coverage 
of the common law. It has shown a resilience and adaptability that guar-
antees that it will be a major factor in the final design of the world legal 
culture. The Hindu legal family is said to cover 450 million people-a 
greater population than the U.S. or all the E.U. countries combined. A 
variety of indigenous legal cultures may emerge from under superficial 
acceptance of the European legal systems. Non-transatlantic instincts, 
such as the Chinese and Japan exultation of cooperative values over indi-
viduality, will also increasingly vie for place in the world's legal 
philosophy. And history and humility tell us that there are influences, 
philosophies, and value systems that cannot now be identified which will 
someday change, perhaps radically, the make up of the legal system. 
This Article then presents only a framework for contemplating the 
future of the world's legal culture. It starts from the known dominant legal 
regimes to offer only one of a large, perhaps infinite, variety of extensions 
of these regimes into the world. And it has largely ignored the assured 
influence of any number of alternatives. For example, it has not attempted 
to predict the impact of human imagination and creativity on the emerg-
ing global legal culture. Still, I hope it is a fair start in envisioning the 
substance and scope of our future global legal culture. 
